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Executive Summary 
Objectives 
In an environment characterised by fragmentation in the market structure of wholesale 
and retail entities, significant diversity in terms of remuneration schemes as well as 
regulations pertaining to operational features of wholesale and retail entities, but also 
significant developments in policy and practice concerning distribution, the objective of 
this report, is twofold: First, to map the distribution chain in EU Member States, including 
the main actors in wholesaling and retailing, discuss the requirements to provide certain 
services and outline their sources of remuneration, both direct and indirect. Second, to 
collect and analyse data on distribution margins, fees and service requirements in the 
originator and generic markets in EU Member States with a view to understanding the 
impact the distribution chain is having on the prices of reimbursable prescription only 
medicines (POMs). The report does not address issues relating to over-the-counter (OTC) 
medications.  
Methods 
The report relies on both primary and secondary data and information. Secondary data and 
information come from available peer review literature and reports, whereas primary 
sources relate to information collected via semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders (both individuals, corporate entities and associations), notably wholesalers, 
pharmacists, representatives of pharmaceutical industry (both branded and generic), 
patient representatives and payers/health insurers. 
Market structure of pharmaceutical wholesaling and retailing in the EU  
There is a diversity and fragmentation of wholesaling and retailing entities at EU level, as 
reflected by the market structure of both wholesaling, but, more importantly, retailing 
entities. Significant variation continues to exist in the density of wholesale and retail 
outlets in the EU, propagated by national regulation and historical patterns. 
There exist different densities in terms of number of wholesalers and number of 
pharmacies in the population in the member states, as well as different regulatory policies 
setting the operating framework for distribution (both wholesale and retail) outlets. 
Some consolidation in activities has been observed over time, particularly in pharmacies, as 
experienced by horizontal integration through pharmacy chains, but also differential 
regulation regarding the extent to which such consolidation can take place. 
Vertical integration has been on the ascendancy particularly with wholesaler groups taking 
over pharmacies or pharmacy chains, although the opposite is also possible.  
The frequency and influence of schemes such as DTP and RWM has risen substantially in 
the past 5 years; this trend can alter the rules of the game, particularly where the public 
service obligation is not present. Through a variety of schemes manufacturers are in a 
position to bypass wholesalers and sell directly to pharmacies.  
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Elements of diversification (expansion of services) by both wholesalers and pharmacies, 
particularly where there is a squeeze on margins have been shown to exist as a response to 
some of the pressures on margins and the emergence of new distribution models. 
Distribution Margins 
The majority of Member States have regulated markup/margin schemes to both or either 
wholesalers and pharmacies, at least for reimbursable medicines.  
There are different markup/margin schemes for reimbursable and non-reimbursable 
medicines in a few countries; there exist specific schemes for other retailers of prescription 
medicines in the very few countries with such other retailers; and there is a specific 
incentive for dispensing generics in one country (France). 
Regressive markup/margins are very common, but some countries also apply linear 
markups/margins. For pharmacies, dispensing fees are used in a few countries, and in one 
country (Slovenia) pharmacies are funded on a fee-for-service remuneration. Average 
wholesale margins range from 2-24% of PRP (low in Sweden, high in the Netherlands, both 
unregulated private negotiations), with the majority ranging between 4-8% of PRP.   
Considerably less information is available regarding the average pharmacy margin in 
individual countries, however, for the 15 countries for which average pharmacy margins 
could be surveyed, the range is 12-50% of PRP (low in Romania, high in Luxembourg).  
Discounts and rebates play an important role in defining the exact amount of the wholesale 
and pharmacy remuneration. On the one hand, in several countries commercial discounts 
(offered by manufacturers to wholesalers, by wholesalers to pharmacies, by manufacturers 
to pharmacies, and in some cases by pharmacies to patients) are granted, in a few cases 
limited by regulation. The exact amount of these discounts and rebates is confidential. On 
the other hand, wholesalers and, in particular, pharmacies, are obliged to grant discounts 
and rebates to public payers in nine countries (known as “claw back” or “solidarity 
contribution”).  
Impact of Wholesale and Retail Margins on the Prices of Prescription Medicines  
It looks as though that there is a tremendous range in prices at each stage of the exercise 
from EFP to gross PRP between EU27 Member States.  This price spread is significantly 
more apparent in generic medicines than it is in branded, and far more apparent in less 
expensive medicines than more expensive medicines. 
Although EFP appears to some extent to predict approximately the final gross PRP to the 
payer, this is not always the case.  Countries such as Greece, Italy and Luxembourg for 
branded medicines, and the Netherlands for generic medicines saw dramatic changes in 
their ranking with the addition of wholesale and pharmacy margins. This highlights the fact 
that the impact of distribution is different in different Member States. 
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It appears that the application of distribution margins may be different between branded 
and generic medicines, in some countries in particular.  Countries with consistently low 
EFP, in some cases less than 5 percent of the final gross PRP, were Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden – of interest these countries also had low relative EFP for 
their branded counterparts.   
The impact of distribution costs and taxation on health systems and payers also seems to 
vary significantly by type of drug (brand vs generic).  
The impact of distribution costs and taxation on health systems and payers also seems to 
vary significantly in the generics case as it does in the branded medicines case, although the 
variation in this case is far greater than in branded medicines (as shown on Figure 5.3).  
The structure of wholesale and retail margins does mean that in certain, but extreme, cases 
the impact of distribution costs and taxation exceeds 90% of the total cost to payer and the 
average seems to be higher than in the case of branded medicines. 
The changing market structure – impact on stakeholders 
Manufacturers would in principle be interested in a supply chain that guarantees the 
efficient distribution of their products for the intended markets and at reasonable cost. 
Access to patient information at the micro level (i.e. in individual communities) would be 
key and an area worth investing in. In an era of logistics and stock management being 
driven remotely by advances in information and communication technology (ICT), the 
value-added of certain components of the distribution chain have often been questioned in 
relation to the services provided and the overall cost of these services. As a result, it is not 
surprising that manufacturers explore alternative (wholesale) distribution arrangements. 
Wholesalers feel squeezed by current practices as well as some recent developments. 
Current practices in wholesaling suggest that wholesalers typically offer a proportion (in 
some cases significant) of their allowable margin as a discount to pharmacy. Interviews 
with wholesaler stakeholders alluded to actual margins ranging between 1.5 – 3.5%. 
Pharmacy chains may have greater negotiating power and can, as a result, benefit from a 
higher discount from wholesaling, although the extent to which this is true at aggregate 
level is unclear and can be the subject of further scrutiny. 
Competition among wholesalers for the retail business has intensified in recent years by 
developments in IT and logistics, as well as the entry of manufacturers who are 
increasingly interested in establishing direct vertical links with the retail business. In some 
cases, this is resulting in the map of players on the market being re-drawn with 
consolidation of existing entities and entry of others or a re-definition of activities by 
existing players.  
These dynamic developments can have a significant impact on wholesaling and the 
competitive advantages it has in the distribution of medicines. Interviews with wholesalers 
and other stakeholders indicate that the traditional full-line wholesaling model (stocking 
the widest possible gamut of pharmaceutical products, easy access to stock by and timely & 
frequent delivery to retailers) is under dispute – indirectly - in a number of Member States, 
particularly those where the environment is more flexible regarding ownership and 
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integration. As a result, if wholesaling is to survive it will probably need to develop further 
competences and links downstream strengthening existing advantages. 
Retail market structure remains diverse across EU Member States, as does the regulatory 
environment relating to ownership, procurement and ability to integrate both horizontally 
and vertically. 
Greater efficiencies can be achieved by joint procurement and this can materialize through 
a horizontally or a vertically integrated structure or a cooperative. Countries where 
horizontal or vertical integration are limited by current legislation are taking advantage of 
the “cooperative solution”, e.g. Spain, France and Greece.  
Redefining the role of pharmacy is a great pursuit, particularly in what concerns health 
promotion, prevention, aspects of disease management and monitoring. There may be 
considerable benefits to society and the health care system from this development in terms 
of quality, access and cost. Pharmacy chains are likely to benefit more from this 
development in terms of volume, facilities within pharmacy and network or population 
coverage. Yet, the willingness of health authorities to pursue this remains sluggish.  
An important competitive advantage of pharmacy, making it an attractive target to pursue 
further consolidation in the field is its direct relationship with the patient population and 
the use by the latter as a source of information and advice. This is already driving 
developments in some Member States and further developments are still to come. Where 
access to pharmacy problems exist, particularly in rural or/and remote areas, alternative 
solutions may exist, e.g. via dispensaries or dispensing physicians. 
Patients are in principle neutral to consolidation in the distribution sector, so long as 
access and availability of medicines are not compromised and the range of available 
services increases at no additional cost to them. Increasing services at pharmacy level 
could prove beneficial particularly if they are offered in a timely fashion and avoiding 
waiting times. In some instances, patients have raised questions about access to services 
and the length of time it takes for them to access a pharmacy. This is particularly important 
for elderly and vulnerable patients in rural areas. Where these phenomena exist action 
could be taken by the competent authorities to ensure that access remains at acceptable 
levels. Where pharmacy chains occupy a significant proportion of retail distribution access 
problems in rural areas could be addressed by operating chain outlets in problem areas. 
From a payer perspective, greater consolidation could mean lower distribution costs 
because of economies of scale in procurement and distribution, taking advantage of 
common networks and more efficient operations. In theory, consolidation would imply 
lower fixed costs, but it is questionable whether compressing these can be achieved ad 
infinitum. It may even be doubtful whether cost reductions can be achieved in the first 
place given the changing patterns in the distribution of medicines and the increasing 
proliferation of agency and reduced wholesaler models.  
But even if these models are not taken into account for a moment, it is likely that the 
environment in the distribution chain is becoming more competitive with payers 
demanding greater generic dispensing (and, therefore, at a lower overall margin) and 
driving the market for generic products, as it has recently been seen with outpatient 
tendering in some countries (the Netherlands, Germany, and Hungary, among others).  
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Such developments are unlikely to enable further sustainable reductions in margins 
without having an impact on market structure of distribution.  
Additional services that can be provided by retail pharmacies could go some way to 
maintain existing structures, yet, it is not always clear what additional value these services 
create and what an adequate remuneration is as a result. For instance, health promotion 
campaigns, monitoring, audit, or clinical governance could be undertaken by pharmacies, 
yet, a number of stakeholders at national and regional level have suggested that they 
cannot support financially these services. 
In an environment characterized by consolidation, payers need to be mindful that access to 
pharmacies is maintained overall, particularly in rural areas, which are, in principle, under-
provided. In areas where there seems to be a problem, rural pharmacies can be offered 
financial incentives to continue operating for the benefit of the wider community they 
serve.  
Changes to the prevailing distribution model 
The changing nature of distribution and the advent of the agency and the reduced 
wholesaler models, is beginning to have a significant impact in some countries. In principle, 
changes in the distribution model should make the process of delivering medicines from 
factory gates to the patient bed-side more efficient and cost-effective. Yet, there seem to be 
some concerns about the availability of medicines; it could be the case that manufacturers’ 
activities in streamlining supplies and managing stock coupled with the ever fragmented 
nature of distribution, can lead to shortages in some markets. 
Clearly, there all kinds of incentives and disincentives from different stakeholders’ 
perspective (manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers) in this process, but these do not seem 
to be aligned at all times. Payers, on the other hand, find little reason to intervene unless 
patient access to medicines is significantly affected or shortages are shown to be having an 
impact on care and outcomes. At the same time, it looks as though breaches from the public 
service obligation do not necessarily occur in situations where a reduced wholesaler model 
operates. This may be the subject of a wider further discussion on the subject. Competent 
authorities, where appropriate have intervened to provide some clarity on some of the 
newly emerging rules of the game. 
 
Policies on distribution margins and their implications 
The stakeholder perspectives in this part of the analysis revealed significant rifts in the 
perceptions of stakeholders about their respective contributions. 
Manufacturers recognize the importance and contribution of the distribution sector to 
ensuring access and availability of medicines to patients. Yet, it is often argued that the cost 
of distribution is in many cases disproportionate to the value it offers to the general public 
and, as such, should be reconsidered and become more in-line with the contribution that 
the pharmaceutical sector makes in terms of bringing new therapeutic alternatives to 
market. Equally, it has been argued that where brands and generics co-exist, the structure 
of margins and markups in many cases favour generic medicines, thus creating an unequal 
playing field among equivalent therapeutic options. This is exacerbated in situations where 
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therapeutic reference pricing exists and where branded, in-patent products are included in 
therapeutic clusters.  
Partly as a result of the above, it is not uncommon for manufacturers to consider more 
direct options to distribute their products and reach pharmacies. Although this implies 
considerable initial investment, it is often considered worthwhile. Other stakeholders in 
the distribution chain contend that these movements by manufacturers automatically 
result in wholesale (and, potentially, retail) margins and other income being curtailed as 
manufacturers can re-define the terms of wholesaler engagement. 
Wholesalers operate on the basis of large volume and small margin. They feel squeezed by 
the nature of competition and the requirements of public service obligation and frequent 
distribution to retail outlets, the net result being a very low net margin on wholesale 
distribution of medicines. They also perceive recent changes in the distribution model in a 
number of Member States, particularly relating to higher cost medicines, as partial and 
creaming off a significant source of revenue for their operations. Where already 
experienced, the direct involvement of manufacturers in distribution has changed the way 
the sector operates and the ability of wholesalers to compete and offer value deals to their 
customers. 
It is likely that if these trends become more generalised in the years to come, the wholesale 
sector will experience further consolidation. Already, as pointed out at interview, a number 
of wholesalers have gone out of business or have merged with others, as a direct impact of 
the above trends. 
Pharmacists often feel they are asked to do more for less, that there is reluctance by payers 
to remunerate them for additional services rendered and that, as a result, other segments 
within pharmacy is cross-subsidising the POM segment. Importantly, the changing role of 
pharmacy in the community does not necessarily seem to be reflected by actions at policy 
level. In addition, their ability to negotiate terms with wholesalers is beginning to change in 
environments where products are delivered directly by manufacturers and where 
pharmacy is incurring a significantly higher cost in search of product. 
Patients are largely unaware of the costs of distribution and their primary consideration is 
the availability and affordability of medicines. Distribution remuneration, particularly at 
retail level, should capture some of the gaps in availability, particularly in remote or rural 
areas where such problems seem to be more acute. Patients in some cases argue that the 
pursuit of profit across pharmacy chains is responsible for problems in the geographical 
allocation of pharmacies and that this ought to be addressed. 
Insurers face a significant cost of distribution and taxation. Significant changes have taken 
place over the past decade in the majority of Member States in an attempt to reduce the 
impact of distribution (but not taxation) and calibrate remuneration structures, often 
resulting in a reduction of wholesaler and – in some cases – retail margins. 
In some cases, health insurers have experimented with “novel” initiatives for the retail 
market, such as tendering and rebate policies. Apart from the unintended consequences 
that such schemes may have, these initiatives have revealed, among other things, the 
reservation price of mature (off-patent) medicines and the cost payers should be paying 
without it being inflated by discounts. 
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In some Member States the cost of taxation is set at disproportionate levels. While a 
majority of Member States have set reduced (or zero) VAT rates for prescription medicines, 
in some (e.g. Austria, Denmark and Germany) normal rate VAT levels reflect the perception 
of prescription medicines as normal consumption goods. While there is little in terms of a 
theoretical or empirical justification for imposing VAT on prescription medicines, its use 
reflects a reverse tax by national Treasuries on health care resources. Yet, it appears that 
there is little Ministries of Health or sickness funds can do to mitigate this, as it relates to 
national (taxation) policy priorities, where decisions are taken by Finance Ministries. 
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1. Background and Objectives 
In recent years there has been considerable focus on the impact the distribution chain is 
having on the total cost of prescription pharmaceuticals. Policy-makers have been cutting 
the remuneration for distribution, while in a few countries they have also been trying to 
provide incentives to certain parts of the distribution chain to enable the use of cost 
effective alternatives. At the same time, the distribution chain has witnessed considerable 
consolidation in the past decade, which has manifested itself in horizontal but also vertical 
integration with varying degrees of intensity and depending on national regulations. New 
paradigms in prescription medicines’ distribution, such as Direct to Pharmacy Distribution 
(DTP), have begun to manifest themselves in some European markets with varying degrees 
of intensity. 
There is limited literature relating to distribution margins and their impact on prices of 
medicines.  One cross-country European study comparing prices and margins for a basket 
of 20 medicines found significant variations in ex-factory prices (Italy lowest), distribution 
margins (Netherlands and UK lowest) and third party payer prices (Germany highest) 
(Garattini et al, 2008).  Earlier studies found similar results (Martikainen et al, 2005; ÖBIG 
2004), and both studies concluded that prices were lower in countries with strict pricing 
control policies, such as Italy, France and Spain. 
Evidence from available sources suggests that wholesale margins, particularly in some 
Scandinavian countries, are the subject of negotiation between manufacturers and 
wholesalers; there are often different margins for non-reimbursable OTC drugs versus 
reimbursable drugs; that in most countries margins appear regressive and linear, and that 
in most maximum-set margins exist; most countries have lower value added taxation for 
pharmaceuticals than other goods, and may have different rates for reimbursable versus 
non-reimbursable medicines. 
In an environment characterised by fragmentation in the market structure of wholesale 
and retail entities, significant diversity in terms of remuneration schemes as well as 
regulations pertaining to operational features of wholesale and retail entities, but also 
significant developments in policy and practice concerning distribution, the objective of 
this report, is twofold: 
• First, to map the distribution chain in EU Member States, including the main actors 
in wholesaling and retailing, discuss the requirements to provide certain services 
and outline their sources of remuneration, both direct and indirect.  
• Second, to collect and analyse data on distribution remuneration (margins, fees)in 
the originator and generic markets in EU Member States with a view to 
understanding the impact the distribution chain is having on the prices of  
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reimbursable prescription-only medicines (POM). The report does not examine the 
requirements for or regulations and arrangements pertaining to counter medicines 
(OTC) medicines. 
Section 2 outlines the methodology employed in the report outlining primary and 
secondary data collection sources. Section 3 presents the key trends in market structure of 
wholesaling and retailing in EU27. Section 4 presents updated remuneration policies and 
practices in wholesaling and retailing, while section 5 builds on the previous sections by 
presenting the impact distribution is having on the final prices of prescription medicines 
(both branded and generic) reimbursed by payers in EU-27. Section 6 teases out some of 
the emerging issues in distribution in a small number of EU countries, whereas section 7 
provides an overall discussion of developments in the EU pharmaceutical distribution also 
by drawing on views and perspectives of individual stakeholders. Finally, section 8 
summarises the main conclusions of the study. 
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2. Methodology 
The study relies on both primary and secondary data sources.  Primary data collection 
consisted of structured interviews conducted between May and September 2010 with a 
number of stakeholders, including:  
• the European Association of Pharmaceutical Full Line Wholesalers (GIRP – 
www.girp.eu), representing the national associations of full line wholesalers,  
• the Pharmaceutical Group of the EU (PGEU – www.pgeu.eu), representing the 
national associations of pharmacists, in EU countries.   
These structured interviews primarily explored the degree of regulation of their country 
member activities, the degree of integration occurring both vertically and horizontally, as 
well as confirming the information contained in the distribution database.  A list of the 
questions posed to these associations is contained in Appendix 1.  Additional material and 
information was collected during the workshop on distribution organized by the European 
Commission in Brussels on July 1 and 2, 2010. 
Supplementary structured interviews took place with key stakeholders in Austria, Belgium, 
Greece, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Baltics and the UK in 
order to tease out issues related to wholesale and pharmacy retail distribution 
developments, regulation and market structure.  Stakeholders included wholesalers, 
pharmacists and their representative bodies, decision makers (health insurance and 
payers), patients and manufacturers.  Interviews took place between May and mid-
September 2010. This information was subsequently used to inform some of the issues 
facing individual countries (section 6) and the stakeholder analysis (section 7). 
The secondary data collection comprised a comprehensive literature search, review and 
analysis of both peer reviewed studies and grey literature.  The search phrase [wholesale 
AND (“margins” OR “mark up”) OR (“pharmacy” OR “retail” AND (“margins” OR “mark up”)] 
with limits of English language was entered into PubMed and returned 46 published 
studies from January 1998 to July 2010.  Of these 46 studies, 23 were not related to 
pharmaceutical distribution systems, 6 were related to medical devices or illicit drugs and 
2 were related to distribution in developing countries.  The abstracts of the remaining 15 
articles were read for relevance, with 2 rejected due to non-relevance and 7 addressing 
distribution outside the EU27.  The remaining 6 studies were read, of which 3 studies were 
relevant to this paper and the rejected 3 did not include sufficient details on margins to 
warrant adding to this document.  Exploration of similar terms in Google Scholar generated 
5 additional non-peer reviewed studies.  Additional sources of information were gathered 
from studies on the subject conducted by ECORYS, ÖBIG as well as the Pharmaceutical 
Pricing and Reimbursement Information (PPRI) Country Reports. 
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Second, a distribution database was created containing the most recent details (2008 
onwards) of wholesale and retail distribution for reimbursable pharmaceuticals in EU27. 
Details included: margin/mark up types (regressive, linear, fee for service), variations in 
margin application (client differentials, medicine class differentials – eg for different types 
of medicines), VAT, average margins/markups, discounts/clawbacks/rebates (mandatory, 
commercial), regulation details, degree of integration allowed (horizontal, vertical), 
wholesale distributors (how many, top companies), pharmacies (how many).  Data was 
collected from the most recent Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Information 
(PPRI) country reports plus updates by the PPRI secretariat in consultation with the 
authorities as well as national and EU-operating associations. The country information per 
margin/markup types were classified and graphed.   
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3. Market structure of pharmaceutical wholesaling and retailing in the EU  
3.1 Market Structure in Wholesaling 
The majority of countries have a mixture of national and regional wholesalers supplying 
medicines to pharmacies, with national wholesalers in principle providing the full range of 
medicines (“Full Line Wholesalers) and regional wholesalers providing either full or partial 
range of medicines (“Short Line” refers to stocking of limited list of medicines, Figure 3.1).  
Although regionally-operating wholesalers may be more plentiful than wholesalers 
operating at national level, except for France, Ireland and Romania, national wholesalers 
command the largest share of the market, except for Portugal and Spain where regional 
wholesalers have greater than 50 percent market share. In Greece there is spatial 
segmentation, whereby wholesalers operate at regional level as legislation only allows 
them to have one warehouse in the part of the country where they operate, plus a 
commercial interest in another warehouse in another part of the country. Minimum 
frequencies of delivery by wholesalers range from once to three times daily (Figure 3.2) 
and in the majority of cases are the outcome of public service obligation (with the 
exception of the UK, where such requirement does not exist). 
A minority of countries (Sweden, Finland) have single channel systems where a wholesaler 
has the exclusive right to distribute medicines for a manufacturer. This has an impact on 
the relationship between manufacturer and wholesaler. In single-channel countries, there 
is usually a very low number of wholesaler companies, which have a stronger market 
power than wholesalers in multi-channel systems (ÖBIG 2003). The remaining 25 EU 
Member States apply multi-channel systems in wholesaling, in which medicines of a 
manufacturer are distributed and supplied in parallel via different wholesalers. 
In the last decade, nearly all countries have seen mergers in the wholesale sector and a 
decline in the number of operating wholesaler companies (PPRI Country Reports). 
The above patterns and trends in market structure must be examined critically in view of 
recent changes in wholesale and retail distribution of pharmaceuticals. The advent of 
agency models and reduced wholesaler models (discussed in greater detail in section 3.4) 
in wholesale distribution of medicines now means that pharmaceutical manufacturers can 
supply pharmacies directly (Direct-To-Pharmacy or DTP) by using a single (or multiple) 
wholesaler (s) as logistics provider (Agency Model, AM) for part or all of their product 
portfolio. Equally, manufacturers can contract with a small number of wholesalers for part 
or all of their product portfolio. This unavoidably has implications for the market structure 
in the wholesaling business and implies that wholesaling becomes more segmented as a 
result. 
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Figure 3.1: Description of national and regional wholesaler presence per EU27 member state 
countries (2010). 
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Source: Authors’ compilations from GIRP Member Database, 2010. 
Note: Greece is starred (*) as its comparison is between cooperative wholesalers (each working 
regionally however have strong bonds nationally) and private regional wholesalers.  Greece has no 
national wholesalers. 
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Figure 3.2: Number of minimum daily Wholesaler deliveries to Pharmacies across the EU27 
member states (2010). 
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Note: No data available for Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malta, Luxembourg, and Poland. 
Source: Authors’ compilations from GIRP Member Database, 2010; PPRI Country Reports (2006-
2008). 
 
3.2 Market Structure in Retail Pharmacies 
All countries display a stable number of community pharmacies since 2000, with 
community pharmacies being the primary pharmaceutical retailers although in Austria 
self-dispensing physicians still play a strong role  (Figure 3.3, upper panel).  Greece, 
Bulgaria and Cyprus have the highest number of pharmacies per capita, while Denmark, 
Sweden and Slovenia have the lowest (Figure 3.3, lower panel).  In more than half of the 
EU27, there are regulations on pharmacy ownership (13 countries) and/or criteria 
regulating the establishment of new pharmacies (16 countries) (Table 3.1). In Finland, 
there is no legislation regarding the establishment of new pharmacies, but according to the 
Medicines Act, there must be a sufficient number of pharmacies country-wide to allow the 
general public, wherever possible, to obtain medicines without difficulty. There is some 
trend towards deregulation of establishing new pharmacies. For instance, criteria for the 
opening of new pharmacies were removed.  
Usually, geographic or demografic criteria, or a mixture of both, apply for the opening of 
new pharmacies. For example in Austria, pharmacies must be more than 500 meters apart 
and the number of people who continue to be supplied by adjoining pharmacies must not 
drop below5,500 customers for a new pharmacy to be opened.. In France, Greece, Italy and 
Spain only pharmacists may be owners (albeit in some countries as co-owners) and may 
only own one pharmacy.   
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Generic substitution is allowed under various conditions (in 20 countries, thereof 
mandatory in 7 countries) and in 8 countries pharmacists must dispense the lowest priced 
medicine.  Wholesaler discounts to pharmacies are formally allowed in all countries except 
the Czech Republic, Finland and Greece, although wholesalers in Greece typically give a 
discount to pharmacies from their allocated margin (information based on interviews).  
Besides community pharmacies, other dispensaries which are allowed to dispense 
prescription medicines to outpatients may be allowed. One reason for this is to guarantee 
medicines provision in remote (e.g. rural) areas. This is most commonly undertaken by 
dispensing doctors, who have been in place in Austria, France, Hungary, Ireland, the UK and 
the Netherlands. However, apart from Austria, their number has been declining and they do 
not play a major role in the retail sector. Only in Austria does the number of pharmacies 
equal the number of dispensing doctors (around 1,000 each). Furthermore, hospital 
pharmacists may be allowed, under specific conditions, for specific patients and/or specific 
products, to dispense to out-patients (e.g. in the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, 
Lithuania) (PHIS 2010). Branches of pharmacies under the supervision of a pharmacy (e.g. 
Austria, Germany) or outlets (e.g. “medicines chests” in Sweden) may be another option to 
address this issue. Additionally, dispensaries whose product range is limited to OTC 
products might be allowed and operate in a number of countries (e.g. Czech Republic, 
Poland, Portugal). 
While distance selling of OTC products or ordering of OTC products with a community 
pharmacy which may subsequently deliver the ordered products as home deliveries is 
allowed in some  countries (Belgium, Hungary, Poland, Portugal), the selling of prescription 
medicines over the internet is much more restricted (PPRI 2010).  Only Denmark, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK allow internet pharmacies to 
exist, defined as “the long distance purchase of Prescription-Only-Medicines (POMs) from 
Internet sources outside of the network of actual pharmacies”.  In Germany, the internet 
pharmacy must have a special license, ensure proper storage and transportation, correct 
delivery, advice given to patients, less than two days delivery time, risk management 
system, track-and-trace of parcels and ensure availability of all medicines.  In 2005, there 
were 1,420 internet pharmacies in Germany (PPRI-Germany, 2008).  In the Netherlands, 
internet pharmacies must be attached to an actual pharmacy.  In Sweden, patients have an 
electronic ID to access their electronic prescriptions, choose which medicines to order as 
well as examine previously prescribed medicines.  Medicines are delivered to patients’ 
homes, post office or local pharmacy within 3-5 days.  Counseling can take place at a local 
pharmacy or over the telephone via a call centre.  In the UK, internet pharmacies must be 
legally constituted with a supervising pharmacist and a storehouse.   
Other countries have allowed pharmacies to set up E-trade which include both OTC and 
POMs (Czech Republic, Denmark, Portugal Sweden).  In Denmark, POMs may be ordered 
and paid for over the internet and can be sent to an address of a patient’s choosing or 
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picked up at the pharmacy.  In Portugal, medicines can only be delivered to the registered 
home address, and websites of pharmacies are monitored for stating prices, delivery and 
payment conditions, geographical area of operation, delivery time, and pharmacy contact 
details.  In 2008, 90 pharmacies were registered as providing this internet service in 
Portugal (PPRI-Portugal, 2008). 
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Figure 3.3:  Number of community pharmacies across the EU27 region.  Top panel presents 
pharmacies per capita, while lower panel presents total number of pharmacies.  Please note: 
Austria also has dispensing physicians (approximately 1,000) which are not included here. 
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Source: PPRI Country Reports, ECORYS 2006 report, GIRP 2007, ÖBIG 2007 report. 
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Table 3.1: Description of degree of regulation of wholesalers and pharmacies across EU27 countries, 2010  
 Pharmacist 
generic 
substitution 
allowed 
Pharmacist 
must sell at 
lowest 
price 
Wholesale 
rebate to 
Pharmacies 
Regulation 
of 
Wholesale 
margins 
Pharmacy 
chain 
allowed 
Pharmacy 
ownership 
by non-
pharmacist 
Regulation of 
establishment 
of new 
pharmacies 
Pharmacy 
ownership 
Regulation 
Internet 
Pharmacy 
allowed 
Austria ß ß    ß ß/    ß 
Belgium ß ß       ß 
Bulgaria ß ß     ß ß ß 
Cyprus ß/  -  ß   ß  ß 
Czech Rep.  ß ß ß/    ß ß  
Denmark    ß  ß    
Estonia  ß      ß ß 
Finland   ß ß ß ß ß/   ß 
France  ß   ß ß   ß 
Germany     ß/  ß    
Greece ß ß ß  ß ß   ß 
Hungary     ß/  ß/   ß ß 
Ireland ß ß     ß ß ß 
Italy  ß   ß ß   ß 
Latvia  - ß      ß 
Lithuania  -     ß  ß 
Luxembourg ß    ß ß   ß 
Malta  - -     - ß 
Netherlands    ß   ß ß  
Poland  -     ß ß ß/  
Portugal     ß/   ß  ß/  
Romania  ß      ß ß 
Slovakia  -     ß ß  
Slovenia  ß   ß ß   ß 
Spain  ß/    ß ß   ß 
Sweden    ß   ß ß  
UK ß   ß      
Note: ß/  implies the condition occurs only under certain regulations or in some special situations. 
Note regarding generic substitution: obligatory in the public sector, not allowed in the private sector 
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Note regarding regulation of wholesale margins: there is a joint markup for wholesale and pharmacy in the Czech Republic, margin only 
applicable in the private sector in Cyprus and Malta, plus only for locally-manufactured medicines in Cyprus 
Notes regarding internet pharmacy: Denmark and Czech Republic – online pharmacy must be handled by an actual community pharmacy; 
in Poland online pharmacy is only allowed for OTC products; Belgium, Portugal, Hungary: no Internet pharmacies are allowed, but 
community pharmacies may offer the possibility of ordering medicines (only OTC in case of Belgium and Hungary) via Internet and are 
allowed to send them by mail order. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilations; ÖBIG 2010, PPRI Country Reports, PPRI 2010, GIRP Member State Database (June 2010). 
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3.3 Integration in Distribution 
3.3.1. Horizontal Integration 
Horizonal integration is defined as a fusion of entities pursuing the same line of business.  
There is little horizontal integration among wholesalers although there are a few operating 
at EU level. Increasingly, pharmacy chains are becoming more prevalent in Member States.  
In 19 countries pharmacy chains are allowed, again under specific condition in a few 
countries (Table 3.1). In Estonia, Lithunia and the UK more than 80 percent of the market is 
dominated by pharmacy chains, while in Ireland almost half of pharmacies belong to a 
chain.  Previously in Sweden only one pharmacy chain existed, the state owned Apoteket, 
however, recent changes have opened up the market with over 14 chains sharing the 
pharmacy market. 
3.3.2. Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration is the fusion of entities who have complementary business interests.  In 
the pharmaceutical value chain, this can mean fusion between wholesaler and retailer, or 
manufacturer wholesaler and retailer. Integration between wholesalers and pharmacies is 
a key trend, although it is bound by regulations in different countries. One prerequisite is 
whether pharmacies can be owned by non-pharmacists. In 18 countries non-pharmacists 
may own pharmacies, sometimes under specific conditions (e.g. having a pharmacist 
present, as is the case in Belgium and Portugal; or having a pharmacist being the (majority) 
owner of the pharmacy, as is the case in Austria, Denmark, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Romania). Some specific stakeholders (in particular prescribers or the 
pharmaceutical industry) may be explicitly forbidden to own pharmacies (e.g. Estonia, 
Sweden).  In Austria, integration is allowed only if the operating pharmacist holds the 
majority of shares (51%) and has exclusive management power.  Other countries where 
vertical integration is allowed, either with or without restrictions are: Belgium, Estonia, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal (limited) and the UK.  In 
Estonia, wholesalers and pharmacies cannot directly integrate but their subsidiary 
company can integrate.  In Lithuania, most large wholesalers own pharmacy chains (i.e. 
Tamro wholesalers owns Farmacijos Projectai pharmacies).  In Ireland and the UK, 
integration has occurred with some national and some European wholesalers.  In Ireland, 
the German wholesaler Celesio owns both a local wholesaler (Cahill May Roberts Ltd) as 
well as a pharmacy chain (Unicare). 
Changes in the prevailing distribution models as well as pressurces on the market and the 
type of products that are dispensed mean that consolidation in this field can be significant. 
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Figure 3.4:  Proportion of Pharmacy market share as source of delivery, including Full Line 
Wholesalers, Short Line Wholesalers and direct from Manufacturer, across EU27 region, 2010 
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Source: Authors’ compilations from GIRP Member Database, 2010. 
Note:  Proportion of direct pharmacy sales may be under-represented.  In the UK, Pfizer, 
GSK, AZ and Eli Lilly all use this route. Data not available for Bulgaria, Germany, 
Slovakia, Spain. 
 
 
3.4. The changing nature of the distribution model 
Of significant interest is the development of direct delivery to pharmacy from the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, using a restricted number of wholesalers as sole agents to 
distribute products directly to pharmacy (Direct-To-Pharmacy or DTP), or, indeed, using 
wholesalers as logistics providers for the same purpose. Whereas the majority of pharmacy 
sales continue to originate from (full-line) wholesalers, in a number of countries the 
proportion of pharmacy sales originating directly from the manufacturer is over 10 percent 
(Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK) and can be over 20 percent 
(Czech Republic, France, Italy) (Figure 3.4). 
In Austria medicines can be delivered directly to pharmacies, however, the majority of 
medicines are distributed via wholesalers, and in Bulgaria most manufacturers have their 
own wholesaling (via own development or acquisitions).  In Hungary, a manufacturing 
license also incorporates a wholesaling license.  In France, direct delivery occurs 
particularly for high turnover products, and in Italy manufacturers are allowed to deliver 
directly to the regions to discharged hospital patients and outpatient clinics (e.g. for 
oncology patients).  In the UK, direct distribution occurred particularly for generic 
medicines (PPRI Country Reports 2006-2008; ÖBIG 2006) until recently, but, currently, 
this trend appears to be on the wane (Interviews with Stakeholders, September 2010). In 
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the UK, there has been a significant uptake of DTP arrangements over the past 3 years 
(Table 3.2). GSK was first, Pfizer second (now including Wyeth). With just Astra Zeneca and 
Eli Lilly these cover over 30% of the market. There are also optional offers by some 
companies to sell direct or via mainline wholesalers, eg Roche and Bonviva via Williams, 
Takeda and Prostap via Clarity DTP. Some companies distribute lines that tend to be low 
volume and high cost directly themselves, e.g.  Novartis supply ten low volume for 
dispensing GP lines in the UK, which include Sandimmun and Roche two such (product) 
lines.  
DTP distribution can take place via a variety of schemes. Sole agency is a typical option in 
this case, where the manufacturer would sell directly to their customers with an exclusive 
wholesaler acting as a distributor or a logistics service provider only. Under this type of 
Agency arrangements, the wholesalers never own the stock and, consequently, are not in a 
position to offer any discount on it.  It is also not uncommon for manufacturers to have set 
up their own wholesale distribution channel for part of the portfolio (e.g. Novartis and 
Roche, as shown on Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 
Examples of Agency model applications in the UK, 2010 
Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer 
Wholesalers 
chosen as 
Distributors  
Details of Discounts offered on DTP Schemes 
ALK-Abelló Alliance EpiPen and EpiPen Junior only; Zero Discount (ZD) 
Products 
Astellas Alliance Prograf, Advograf, Mycamine and Modigraf only; ZDs 
AstraZeneca AAH, Alliance Two separate schemes (as below) and ZDs 
1. Invoice Discounts and not cash rebates applied via 
both carriers and not volume related and not handled 
by Forte Pharma 
2. Dispensing Doctor Retrospective Rebate Scheme that 
is volume related (tiered) is cash rebate (BACS) and is 
applied via the AstraZeneca Forte Pharma Team 
GSK AAH, Alliance Access scheme offering a flat 12% across the board. 
(Note GSK vaccines and travel medicines is a separate 
division and not part of this GSK Schemes) 
Eli Lilly  AAH, Phoenix   Three bands 
 34 
1.  15% Celance, Prozac 
2.  8.5% Cialis, Cymbalta, Efient, Humapen., Strattera, 
Yentreve  Zyprexa 
3. ZD Products: Humulin, Byetta Humatrope 
MSD for Sinemet Alliance Temporary distribution arrangements for: Sinemet 
62.5, Sinemet  PLUS,  Sinemet  CR 200/50  and Half 
Sinemet  CR  during period of limited availability 
Novartis    
Ten lines only 
Novartis' own 
Patient Priority 
Supply Service 
Afinator, Exjade, Glivec, Aclasta, Myfortic, Tobi, 
Sandimmun, Zometa, Tasigna, Sandostatin LAR 
Pfizer Alliance Three bands: 1. Flat rate on Lipitor + Viagra at 25%   
2. 8.5% on everything else except ZD Products 
3. ZD products 
Pfizer / Wyeth Alliance  Wyeth Lines now as Pfizer DTP. Pfizer standard 
discount 10.5% except ZD Products. Rapamune syrup is 
the only oral Wyeth ZD Products 
Roche 
Two lines only 
directly through 
Roche Products 
Ltd only 
Pulmozyme (dornase alpha) ampoules 2.5mg and 
Valcyte (valganciclovir) tablets 450mg x 60 in  England, 
Scotland and Wales only. 
Source: British Pharmaceutical Wholesalers’ Association, 2010. 
 
Very often, Reduced Wholesaler Model schemes (RWM) are used to supply pharmacies. In 
RWM (or Reduced Wholesaler Agreements, RWA), pharmaceutical manufacturers use a 
very small number of wholesalers (1-3) in the traditional manner to distribute products. In 
this case, wholesalers purchase the stock, therefore, they can offer a discount. Current 
evidence on practice suggests that a number of manufacturers have selected this route; in 
the UK Sanofi Aventis, Novartis, Janssen-Cilag, Roche, Novo Nordisk and Bayer Schering 
operate with RWM schemes, which, if put together, account for about 20% of the market. 
Examples of what is offered in these circumstances, are shown on Table 3.3.  Further, 
wholesalers have introduced a number of additional surcharges in recent years.  Most now 
have fuel surcharges, stock return surcharges and an underspend surcharge of £300 in the 
UK. 
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Table 3.3 
Reduced Wholesaler Models and their terms, UK, 2010 
Notes: 1 (Alliance)   Discount applied before invoicing. Therefore invoice price is net of discount. 
2 Arrangements above for Bayer do not include Bayer Consumer Care, for Novartis do not 
include Novartis Consumer Health and for Roche do not include Roche Diagnostics and for 
Wyeth do not include Wyeth Consumer Healthcare, Wyeth Vaccines nor SMA Nutrition. For 
Novartis, Table 3.2 outlines the ten lines that are subject to the Agency model. 
Company AAH  Alliance1          Phoenix 
Bausch & Lomb 4% 0% Zero (4% if PSUK) 
Bayer Diabetes               7.5%      8%      6% (+ 2 % for PSUK) 
Bayer-Schering2 6 % 8%      6% (+ 2 % for PSUK) 
Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
8%  7%  7% ( + 1.5 % for PSUK) 
Ferring 6.75%  7%      6% (+ 1 % for PSUK) 
BMS3 usual ethical discount 
terms on qualifying lines 
usual ethical discount 
 terms  on qualifying lines;  
  Baraclude only via 
Alliance 
-------------- 
Janssen-Cilag 6%  7%   7% (+1.5% for PSUK) 
Leo 8% 8%     7% (+ 1% for PSUK) 
LifeScan One 
Touch 
9%  8%   7 %  (+1.5% for PSUK) 
MSD 8% 7.5%  7% (+ 1.5 % for PSUK) 
NAPP  7%  7%   7 %  (+1.5% for PSUK) 
Novartis2 8% 8%  No direct contract   ......   but 
can supply at 8% 
Novo Nordisk  -------- Your usual ethical discount 
 terms  on qualifying 
lines     
Your usual ethical discount 
terms on qualifying lines      
Roche2 8% 7%   ------------- 
Sanofi-Aventis 8 % 7%   7%   (+1.5% for PSUK) 
Schering-Plough 7.5% 7.5%  6% (+2% for PSUK) 
Servier 7.5% from 1st August   7% from 1st August   6%  (+1.5% for PSUK)     
Shire 6.4% but Calcichew  
usual ethical discount 
terms  and Xagrid ZD 
6% but usual ethical 
discount  terms  on 
Calcichew  
5% + 1% for PSUK But full 
ethical discount on 
Calcichew  
Smith & Nephew usual ethical discount 
terms on qualifying lines 
usual ethical discount terms 
on qualifying lines 
Your usual ethical discount 
terms on qualifying lines 
UCB  7%  8%  Neupro is via Alliance 
only 
7% (+1.5% for PSUK)  
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3 BMS will continue to supply a few products direct to dispensing customers and homecare 
companies. These  are aztreonam, etoposide phosphate, abatacept, atazanavir, dasatanib, 
efavirenz, etoposide, didanosine, and stavudine. 
Source:  British Pharmaceutical Wholesalers’ Association, 2010. 
 
DTP and RWM arrangements have implications for integration within the supply chain in 
the sense that selective agreements between manufacturers and wholesalers may force 
some of the latter to consolidate in order to face the emerging type of competition. At the 
same time, these arrangements imply in themselves a different type of vertical integration, 
whereby manufacturers bypass the traditional chain to supply direct to pharmacy (DTP) or 
select which wholesalers to work with (RWM), or, even form their own distribution vehicle 
(Table 3.2). In the DTP arrangements the discounting ability by wholesalers to pharmacy is 
removed, whereas in the RWM arrangements, it is maintained but may be influenced by the 
agreement between the manufacturer and the wholesaler.  
 
3.5 Wholesaler and Pharmacy Expansion of Services 
Pharmacies have increased their breadth of service to include diagnostic and counseling 
services.  In 11 countries repeat dispensing is allowed (with the Netherlands charging an 
additional dispensing fee), and all countries but Cyprus and Slovenia offering medicine 
waste disposal (a charged service in Ireland) (Table 3.4).  Ten countries offer medicines 
review services, and others offer minor diagnostics including blood pressure testing and 
weight (all but Belgium), cholesterol (13) and blood glucose (15).  Medical interventions 
include emergency contraception (11), smoking cessation (all), diabetes management (all 
but Belgium, Ireland, Sweden), asthma management (all but Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Sweden), hypertension management (all but Belgium, Ireland, Sweden), vaccinations (6) 
and home care services (10).   
Other services comprise individual preparations (Austria), weekend services (Austria, 
Belgium charged), dossier pharmaceutique (France), needle exchange programme 
(Portugal), methadone/naltrxone/buprenorfine maintenance (Austria, Portugal), 
promotion of correct use of therapeutic and autovigilance equipment (Portugal), health 
information (Portugal), wound management (Portugal), nutrition services (Portugal), skin 
and hair examinations (Slovenia).  In Ireland, Germany and the UK these additional services 
incur further charges. 
Wholesalers are also offering more services to their clients (such as kitting, re-labelling, 
information services, patient services, clinical trial packaging, waste management and 
returns management), some of which are added on for competition but many are 
obligatory to meet licensing demands.  As a result, most countries have fewer full line 
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wholesale companies which are supplying most of the markets needs.  The potential for 
further mergers or integration at this time appears to be limited by country regulations and 
legal competition protection. 
 
3.6. Concluding remarks 
The trends presented and discussed in this section highlight: 
• First, a diversity and fragmentation of wholesaling and retailing entities at EU level, 
as reflected by the market structure of both wholesaling, but, more importantly, 
retailing entities. Significant variation continues to exist in the density of wholesale 
and retail outlets in the EU, propagated by national regulation and historical 
patterns. 
• Second, different densities in terms of number of wholesalers and number of 
pharmacies in the population in the member states, as well as different regulatory 
policies setting the operating framework for distribution (both wholesale and retail) 
outlets; 
• Third, some consolidation in activities, particularly in pharmacies, as experienced by 
the phenomenon of horizontal integration through pharmacy chains, but also 
differential regulation regarding the extent to which such consolidation can take 
place 
• Fourth, vertical integration has been on the ascendancy particularly with wholesaler 
groups taking over pharmacies or pharmacy chains, although the opposite is also 
possible.  
• Fifth, the frequency and influence of schemes such as Direct To Pharmacy 
Distribution (DTP) through sole agency or reduced wholesaler models (RWM) or 
treating wholesalers purely as logistic providers has risen considerably in the past 
5-7 years; this trend can alter the rules of distribution, particularly where the public 
service obligation is not present. Through a variety of schemes manufacturers are in 
a position to bypass wholesalers and sell directly to pharmacies, or use wholesalers 
as logistics providers only.  
• Sixth, elements of diversification (expansion of services) by both wholesalers and 
pharmacies, particularly where there is a squeeze on margins. 
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Table 3.4 
Description of additional services provided by pharmacies across the EU27 countries.  Starred (*) services have a charge attached to the 
service, services with a ‘S’ are only available at some pharmacies 
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Austria   ß  ß ß     ß  - - - -  
S
   
Belgium *   ß  ß ß ß ß ß  ß ß ß ß  *  
Cyprus   ß ß   ß        ß ß/   - 
Czech Rep.          ß     ß ß ß - 
Denmark * ß   
S
  
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 ß  
S
 * 
S
 ß ß 
S
 - 
Finland *   
S
      ß 
S
    
S
 ß   
France                   
Germany * ß   * * * * * * * * * * ß  * - 
Ireland  ß *
S
 ß ß *
S
 *
S
 *
S
 *
S
 *
S
 *
S
 ß 
S
 ß 
S
 ß ß - 
Italy    ß       
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 ß 
S
  - 
Netherlands * *               * - 
Poland  ß 
S
 ß ß  ß ß  ß 
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 ß ß  - 
Portugal             
S
 
S
 
S
    
Slovakia  ß 
S
 ß  
S
 
S
 
S
 
S
 ß 
S
 
S
 ß 
S
 ß ß 
S
 - 
Slovenia   ß 
S
  
S
 
S
 
S
  ß  
S
 ß 
S
 ß ß 
S
  
Spain  ß  ß           ß   - 
Sweden    
S
  
S
 ß ß 
S
 ß 
S
 ß ß ß 
S
 ß 
S
 - 
UK       * * * *  * - -    - 
Source: Authors’ compilations; PGEU Member Database, 2010. 
Note: The starred (*) services in the UK are all offered on the NHS or via private health insurance. 
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4.  Distribution Margins 
4.1. Evidence from the literature 
Comparison of distribution margins between countries remains scarce in the academic 
literature.  An examination of 2002 prices of eight newly reimbursed medicines in Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK found large 
price gaps between countries, with Ireland consistently recording the highest wholesale 
prices (81% price gap for some medicines) and Spain and Belgium the lowest (Marikainen 
et al, 2005).  The highest net PRP were recorded for Ireland (124% price gap), followed by 
Finland, while the lowest net PRP was found in Belgium, France and the Netherlands.  The 
addition of VAT increased the range of prices, but the ordering of countries remained the 
same.  The authors concluded that wholesale prices appeared to be highest in countries 
where manufacturers have free pricing, however, this did not dictate final PRP. 
Another examination of margin effects on 2004 prices of 20 branded drugs in Belgium, 
France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the UK found Italy had the lowest EFP while 
Germany had the highest (Garattini et al, 2008).  The combination of wholesale and 
pharmacy margin/markups recorded the lowest values for the Netherlands and the UK 
while Spain had the highest.  The highest retail price was found in Germany and Belgium, 
and the lowest in the UK and the Netherlands.  The authors suggested that the lower impact 
of distribution margins in the Netherlands and the UK might be due to liberalization of the 
distribution sector including less restrictions and allowance of pharmacy chains. Another 
study comparing pharmaceutical prices in Austria to other European countries found the 
price range between Austria and other European countries was higher at the pharmacy 
purchasing price level with regard to the ex-factory price level (ÖBIG 2004). 
The examination of the effect of distribution margin/markups on the generic market versus 
branded market also has limited literature.  Simoens in his analysis of the Polish generic 
market believes that the regressive pharmacy margin currently applied in Poland has 
improved generic dispensing but still has not completely removed the incentive to dispense 
branded medicines (Simoens, 2010). 
There is increasing interest in developments in the wholesale market.  Wholesaler margins 
are continually squeezed downwards by pharmacies, in addition to lower manufacturing 
prices and development of the lowest cost generic market (Tuma, 2005), forcing 
wholesalers to expand into offering more services to their primary customers.  The past 
decade has seen wholesaler expansion, via mergers and acquisitions, and, as a 
consequence, overall wholesaler numbers have declined.  In addition, more wholesalers are 
entering pan-European alliances or acquisitions (Macarthur, 2007). 
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Likewise, pharmacies are facing increasing competitive environments.  The development of 
pharmacy chains places strain on independent pharmacies, in addition to the very recent 
development of internet selling (Macarthur, 2007).   
  
4.2. Summary of Wholesale and Pharmacy Margins 
There are a number of different types of margin/markups, notably regressive, linear or 
percentage, flat fee, or a combination thereof.  The pharmacy sector can also apply for fee-
for-service remuneration of specific services.  The regressive margin, most common in the 
EU as seen below for both wholesaling and retail (pharmacy) operations, may be composed 
of a fixed percentage which decreases as the price to which it refers increases. Another 
approach may be a linear or percentage markup where an equation is developed that is 
applied to all price ranges or a flat percentage is applied to all price (usually starting from 
EFP) ranges.  These generally do not have a maximum fee. 
Usually, there are distinct markup/margins for the wholesale and the pharmacy sector, 
however, in the Czech Republic there is a joint maximum markup allowed which is shared 
by the wholesaler and the pharmacy. 
4.2.1 Wholesale Margins across EU27  
The majority of EU27 countries have regulated wholesale (WS) margins, with the 
exceptions of Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK who enter into private 
negotiations with manufacturers (Table 4.1 and Appendix 2).  Likewise, only a minority of 
countries (Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta) have different WS margins for different classes of 
drugs be it locally manufactured versus imported (Cyprus), depending on the country of 
origin (Luxembourg), public versus private market (Malta) (see footnote Table 4.1 for 
details on markups/margins for reimbursable medicines). The most common distinction, 
however, is that there are regulated markups/margins for reimbursable medicines (e.g. FR, 
IE, IT, LT, PL, SK), while non-reimbursable medicines are not regulated. 
The type of margin applied may be linear, referring to a flat rate regardless of price, or 
regressive, referring to decreasing margins with increasing EFP.  More than half of the 
EU27 Member States apply regressive margins (14 countries), with no clear pattern in the 
preference for the quantity of regressive margins chosen between countries (Table 4.1).  
France is the only country where the regressive margin is organized in a way that the 
different scales are cumulative, where the first regressive category will apply its margin, 
the second regressive margin is applied only to the portion above the first regressive 
category (to which applies the first margin), and so forth.   
The costs of wholesale distribution are affected by a number of factors.  Slow moving 
medicines incur greater storage costs than fast moving medicines, compounded by whether 
the product has special storage and handling requirements (as in the case of blood 
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products, narcotics and cold chain products), the shelf life and risk of product expiration.  
The method of ordering also affects costs with telephone ordering incurring greater costs 
than electronic orders.  Preparations costs depend on the number of units per order-line, 
and delivery costs depend on the number of units per delivery.  Finally, the stockholding 
function itself is a significant financial burden to permanently stock full range of medicines. 
In most countries, the wholesale margin is based on the ‘solidarity’ principle, which covers 
the cross subsidization between types of products.  Many generic medicines are now so 
inexpensive fixed costs are difficult to recap, while innovative expensive medicines often 
have higher fixed costs due to storage difficulties described above yet often have a cap or 
are distributed directly.  For example, in France, wholesalers generate 80% of their 
revenue from only 12% of prescription medicines while for 20% of their revenue they 
must distribute 88% of the prescription medicines. 
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Table 4.1: Overview of wholesale distribution margin/markups, types, regulations and discounts/rebates for reimbursable medicines in 
the EU27 (March 2010). 
 Regu-
lated 
Different 
Margins: 
Different 
Drug 
Classes 
Regressive 
≤ 4 
Categories 
Regressive: 
5-9 
Categories 
Regressive: ≥ 
10 
Categories 
Linear 
Mark-
up 
Average WS 
Margin† 
(% PPP) 
Discounts, 
Rebates to 
Health 
Insurance: 
Mandatory 
Discounts, 
Rebates to 
Pharmacies: 
Commercial 
Austria    
A
 - -  ß 6.5 - 13.4%
2008
 ß  
Belgium  ß  - - ß 8.45%
 T,
 
2007
 ß  
Bulgaria  
PM
 ß  - - ß 7-10%
 T,
 
2009
 ß  
Cyprus  
PR
  
B
 - - -  na ß  
Czech Rep. + ph. ß -  - ß 4.3%
 T,
 
2007
 ß  
Denmark ß n.appl. Private Negotiations, Unregulated 6-7%
 T,
 
2009
 ß ß 
Estonia  ß -  - ß na ß  
Finland ß n.appl. Private Negotiations, Unregulated 3.0%
 T,
 
2008
 ß  
France  ß  + ACC - - ß 6.2% T, 2007 ß  
Germany  ß - -  ß 4-6.1% T, 2007 H  
Greece  ß - - -  4% T, 2007   
Hungary  ß    ß 6.04-6.36% T, 2007 ß  
Ireland   C - - -  Na   
Italy   - - -  6.65% 2009, 1 
3%August 2010 
ß  
Latvia  ß -  - ß 3.34%2008 ß  
Lithuania  ß -  - ß 8-9% T, 2005 ß  
Luxembourg   
D
 - - -  Na ß  
Malta  
PR
  
E
 - - -  15% 
PR, 2009, 1
 ß  
Netherlands ß n.appl. Private Negotiations, Unregulated 13-24%
 T,
 
2007
 ß  
Poland  ß - - -  9.78%
2007
 ß  
Portugal  ß - - -  6.87% 
2007
 ß  
Romania  ß  - - ß 10-14% 
2007
 ß  
Slovakia  ß - -  ß n.appl. ß  
Slovenia  ß -  - ß 8-9%
 T,
 
2007
 ß  
Spain  ß  - - ß 3.5% 
T,
 
2007
 ß  
Sweden ß n.appl. Private Negotiations, Unregulated 2-3% 
T,
 
2009
 ß  
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UK ß   
F
 Private Negotiations, Unregulated 12.5% 
2007
 ß  
Notes:  EFP: ex-factory price; LM = locally-manufactured medicines; n.appl. = not applicable; PM: prescription medicines; PR private 
market medicines; T = total market;  
† As more than one source was consulted to find the average margin/markup, different sources present different average 
margin/markups.  In order to reflect the diversity in average margin/markups, a range is presented rather than creating our own 
average which would dilute this diversity. As stated in the heading, the margins refer to the reimbursement market, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
+ ph.: a joint markup for wholesale and pharmacy which is shared by the actors in two sectors 
+ACC: Applied in a cumulative way. 
1 This is the official mark-up; the average mar-up may be different due to discounts to pharmacies. 
A: Different kind of markups for different section of the positive lists (“Red box” versus “Green” or “Yellow Box” of the “Erstattungskodex 
B: Locally produced generics have higher margins than imported drugs, plus no margins in the public system;  
C: High Tech Drug Scheme, controlled drugs and refrigerated drugs have higher margins than General Medical Services scheme and 
community drug scheme;  
D: Different margins applied to Belgian imports than other countries;  
E: Tendering for public National Health Service (NHS) drugs, private negotiations for private drugs;  
F: Branded medicines, generic medicines categories A-C+E+W have different maximum margins; H: In 2011, Pharmaceutical Market 
Restructuring Act comes into action, requiring pharmacies to contribute €200 million annually through a discount to sickness funds.  
Wholesalers will give sickness funds a discount of 0.85% EFP plus wholesalers margins are capped at €72, causing loss for medicines 
greater than €8,470.50 (2009) 
Source: AESGP 2009, GIRP Member Profiles, ÖBIG 2007, PPRI Country Profiles, for updated information on markup/margin regulation 
GÖG/ÖBIG survey with authorities and stakeholders. 
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Countries with regulated wholesale mark-ups which are regressive apply flat rate linear 
markups ranging from 0-20% EFP, where the same rate applies regardless of the EFP.   
The average WS margin applied to all medicines across EU27 ranged from 3-23% (Figure 
4.1) (AESGP 2009, GIRP Member Profiles, , ÖBIG 2007, PPRI Country Profiles).  There does 
not appear to be any pattern between margin type and resulting average margin per 
country, however, countries with unregulated margins appear to be on the highest third of 
the list (Netherlands, UK), although Sweden and Denmark appear on the lowest third of the 
list. 
Figure 4.1 
Average wholesale margins/markups presented across EU27 Countries.  More than one source 
(2007-2010) creates minimum and maximum values.  Countries with * have private negotiations, 
'R' denotes regressive margins and 'L' denotes linear markups. 
Average Wholesale Margins presented across EU27 Countries.  Greater than one source (2007-
2010) creates minimum and maximum values.  Countries with * have private negotiations, 'R' 
denotes regressive margins and 'L' denotes linear markups.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Netherlands *
Romania (R)
Austria (R)
UK *
Bulgaria (R)
Poland (L)
Slovenia *
Luxembourg (L)
Belgium (R)
Denmark *
Portugal (L)
Latvia (R)
Estonia (R)
Ireland (L)
Greece (L)
Germany (R)
Czech Republic (R)
Hungary (R)
Spain (R)
Lithuania (R)
Sweden *
France (R+ACC)
Slovakia
Malta
Italy
Finland *
Cyprus
% EFP
Minimum Reported Average Wholesale Margin
Maximum Reported Average Wholesale Margin  
Source: Authors’ compilations and AESGP 2009, GIRP Member Profiles, ÖBIG 2007, PPRI Country 
Profiles. 
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4.2.2 Pharmacy Margins across EU27  
Pharmacy margins are regulated in a way similar to wholesale margins, with all EU 
countries having regulated pharmacy margins in place, however the UK is applying “softer” 
regulations (officially unregulated). Apart from Cyprus and Malta, where margins are only 
applicable in the private (non-reimbursed medicines) sector, these margins are relevant for 
the reimbursement market in all other countries. Some countries apply their margin 
regulation to the entire market (e.g. Estonia, Greece, Spain, Latvia), or have one stream of 
regulation for the reimbursement market and another scheme applying to the non-
reimbursement market (e.g. Austria, Belgium). 
As with WS margins, across the EU countries, pharmacy margins are either regressive or 
linear in nature or organized as a fee-for-service remuneration.  The majority of countries 
apply regressive margins, particularly with systems using four or less categories (Belgium, 
Bulgaria, France, Spain, Sweden), five to nine categories (Czech Republic – joint markup for 
wholesale and pharmacy, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania), but less 
likely to apply more complex ten or greater categories (Austria, Poland) (Table 4.2 and 
Appendix 2).  These regressive markups may be calculated based on the pharmacy 
purchase price (PPP) or calculated as a margin of the pharmacy retail price (PRP).  The 
number of countries applying a linear markup added on the pharmacy purchase price is 
rather few (e.g. Cyprus, Portugal). 
In some cases, a significant proportion of pharmacy income comes from fixed dispensing 
fees, notably Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK (Table 4.2).  For the 
majority of these countries with dispensing fees, fixed dispensing fees are an additional 
source of pharmacy income added to the pharmacy retail margin, with the exception of the 
Netherlands and the UK.  Usually, the pharmacy remuneration is product-based, in 
particular if it is organized as a percentage markup on the pharmacy purchase price or 
percentage margin of the pharmacy retail price. Another option would be a fee-for-service, 
which a few European countries have; in the European Union arena it is only the case in 
Slovenia. 
In the European countries, the pharmacy markup / margins are regulated as maximum 
markup/margins, meaning that no higher markup / margins may be applied. In most, in 
particular Western European countries, these maximum markups are fully utilized. 
However, in some Central and Eastern Europeam countries, in particular in the OTC sector, 
lower than the officially allowed pharmacy markups/margins are applied which leads to 
the different prices of a product in different pharmacies (PPRI 2008). Commercial 
discounts from wholesalers to pharmacies are allowed in several countries; so are 
commercials discounts granted by pharmacies to patients. However, there may be 
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limitations. For instance, the discount on generics granted by a pharmacy to customers is 
limited at 17% (PPRI Query 2010). 
Additionally, some countries apply mandatory discounts which the pharmacy must grant to 
the public payer (see section 4.2.3). From the pharmacists’ perspective, this is seen as a 
reduction in the pharmacy revenue. 
The regressive margin scheme which several countries apply implies an incentivizing 
factor for higher-priced medicines, as the percentage markup /margin rates for these 
medicines are lower than for lower-priced medicines. However, a specific financial 
incentive linked to the markup/margin scheme for generics or other lower-priced 
medicines (e.g. parallel imported medicines) is not at all common in the EU countries. Only 
in France, the pharmacy markup for generics is designed in a way that in fact the pharmacy 
receives the same amount in Euro when dispensing a generic as for the original product of 
the same active ingredient (same cluster). 
Pharmacy markups/margins, along with the wholesale markups/margins are a policy area 
which is rather often targeted in times of limited budgets. For instance, Belgium introduced 
a new pharmacy remuneration scheme in April 2010, Spain modified the pharmacy 
remuneration in July 2010 (increasing the number of scales in the regressive scheme from 
two to four) and Italy at the end of July 2010 (cut of wholesale margin). 
For other prescribers who are allowed to dispense prescription medicines (usually in the 
reimbursable market), regulation on their remuneration exists (e.g. for dispensing doctors 
in Austria, for hospital pharmacies dispensing to out-patients in France, see Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Overview of pharmacy margin/markups/types, regulations and discounts/rebates for reimbursable drugs in the EU27 (March 
2010). 
 Regu-
lated 
Different 
Margins: 
Different 
Drug 
Classes 
Regressive 
≤ 4 
Categories 
Regressive: 5-9 
Categories 
Regressive: ≥ 
10 Categories 
Linear 
Mark 
Up: 
Flat 
Rate 
Dispensing 
Fees 
Other 
Fees 
Average 
Pharmacy 
Margin† 
(%PRP) 
Discount, 
Rebates: 
Manda-
tory 
Discount, 
Rebates: 
Commer-
cial 
Austria    
PR, SF
 - -  - 
 15%PR
  
DD
 19.16%
2008
   
Belgium  ß  - - - 
 €3.88pp
  
R, INN
 na ß  
Bulgaria  ß  - - - ß ß 18-22% 
T,2007
 ß  
Cyprus ß/   
PR, P
 - - -  ß ß na ß  
Czech Rep.  +WS ß -  - - ß ß na ß  
Denmark  ß - - -   
AF
 19.3% 
2009
  
D
 ß 
Estonia  ß -  - -  
PROG
 ß 19% 
T,2009
 ß  
Finland  ß -  - -  
€0.42pp
 ß 23.6% 
2008
  ß 
France   B, G  +ACC - - - €0.53pp H na ß  
Germany  ß - - -  ß ß 24% 2004  na 
Greece  ß - - -  ß ß na  na 
Hungary  ß -  - - ß ß 19.46% 2005 ß  
Ireland   S - - -  V ß na ß na 
Italy    - - -   ß ß na  C na 
Latvia  ß -  - - ß ß 19% 2008 ß na 
Lithuania  ß -  - - ß ß na ß  
Luxembourg   I - - -  ß ß 46.7-50.2%2007 ß  
Malta ß/   
PR, P
 - - -  ß ß 20% 
PR
 ß ß 
Netherlands  ß - - - - 
€7.28pp
 ß na  
C
  
Poland  ß - -  - ß ß na ß  
Portugal  ß - - -  ß ß 18.25%
2008
 ß  
Romania  ß -  -  ß ß 12-24% 
2008
 ß na 
Slovakia  ß - -   
€0.48pp
 ß 21% 
2007
 ß  
Slovenia   
Points
 - - - - 
€1.4-2.8pp
 ß €2.10pp ß  
Spain  ß  - -  ß ß na 
 C
  
Sweden   
Off-P
  - -  ß 
OP
 21.3%
2008
 ß  
UK ß/   - - -  
€1.52pp
 
HC
 na  
C
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Notes: † As more than one source was consulted to find the average margin/markup, different sources present different average 
margin/markups.  In order to reflect the diversity in average margin/markups, a range is presented rather than creating our own 
average which would dilute this diversity. As stated in the heading, the margins refer to the reimbursement market, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
PR, SF: Higher margins are applied to Private clients than Sickness Fund clients;  
PR, P: Pharmacy markups only in the private sector (non-reimbursable medicines), no markups in the public sector;  
B, G: Generic medicines must provide same remuneration to the pharmacy as Branded medicines;  
S: Different Schemes apply different margins, with the High Tech Drugs Scheme a flat fee of €49.64 monthly;  
I: Imports outside Belgium and Luxembourg have higher margins;  
Points: Fee-for-service remuneration on the points attached to the prescription;  
Off-P: Off patent medicines have an additional €1.04 added on when generic competition is available 
+ WS: a joint markup for wholesale and pharmacy which is shared by the actors in two sector 
+ACC: in a cumulative way. 
pp = per pack; 15%PR: For private customers, pharmacists and dispensing doctors are entitled to add a surcharge of 15% on the 
prices of medicines calculated according to the pharmacy remuneration regulation.  
PROG: Progressive dispensing fee (DF).  If PPP is <€1.28 then DF is €0.38pp, if PPP is €1.29-44.73 then €0 DF, if PPP is >€44.74 
then DF is €5.11pp.;  
V: Varies with item and drug scheme.  Pharmacists are paid €5 for the first 1667 items dispensed, €4.50 for the next 833 
dispensed and €3.50 for all additional item dispensed in a month.  There are a few additional fees varying with item and drug 
scheme.  
A: Consists of linear mark ups which are made regressive due to statutory discounts (urban/rural, high/low turnover) 
DD: For dispensing doctors the same remuneration regulation applies for pharmacies;  
R: when public price is different than the reimbursement price, the patient pays the difference to a maximum of €10.80;  
INN: patient pays €1,19 for dispensing a INN prescription or a Chapter IV drug;  
AF: Additional fees for telephone prescriptions (DKK4.80), after hours purchasing (DKK 12.00), delivery fees (DKK12.00), H: 
Specific remuneration (€28) for hospital pharmacy when dispensing to out-patients (specific medicines are allowed to be 
dispensed);  
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OP: Off patent charge of SEK10 (€1.04) for medicines with no established generic competition;  
HC: Health counseling services 
C: clawback; D mandatory rebates given on public expenses for prescription medicines only (no commercial rebates) 
Sources: AESGP 2009, ÖBIG 2007, PPRI Country Profiles, GÖG/ÖBIG survey with authorities and stakeholders  
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4.2.3 Discounts, rebates and clawbacks across EU27 
Discounts and rebates in all parts of the distribution chain are commonplace and 
part of everyday practice. They are typically classed into commercial and non-
commercial. Commercial discounts are offered by manufacturers to wholesalers, 
by wholesalers to pharmacies and by manufacturers to pharmacies.  In some 
cases discounts are offered from pharmacies to patients.  Non-commercial 
discounts, also known as (mandatory) rebates, are visible, usually based on a 
legal act, and constitute an indirect measure of further price reduction on the 
statutory and/or negotiated prices of medicines. 
 
Commercial discounts 
Commercial discounts also occur in transactions between manufacturers and 
pharmacies in DTP arrangements. These types of discounts are invisible and 
almost impossible to measure with any degree of accuracy. In some cases the 
authorities launch an inquiry on the level of discount in order to calculate the 
extent of the clawback, i.e. part of the discount that accrues to the state (UK, and, 
to a certain degree, the Netherlands). 
Many countries allow commercial rebates or discounts, negotiated between 
manufacturers and wholesalers or between wholesalers and pharmacies (Table 
4.1).  In some cases discounts are part of a stakeholder’s remuneration (e.g. UK, 
the Netherlands). In other cases they are formally disallowed, but in practice 
occur as part of commercial practice (e.g. Germany, buy three for the price of 
two, or offer a discount if payments from pharmacies to wholesalers are made on 
time).  
 
Mandatory wholesale rebates and discounts 
Three countries (Germany, Greece, Ireland) have mandatory wholesale level 
rebates or discounts required by health insurance; these are visible and form 
part of the requirement by the relevant stakeholders to health insurance.  In 
Germany, manufacturers must offer a 6% discount to wholesalers for drugs 
which are not subject to reference pricing.  In rural areas of Greece where 
population averages less than 4,000 inhabitants per town, wholesalers must 
offer pharmacies a discount of 4% PPP, and in turn the manufacturer must offer 
the wholesaler a discount of 0.4% EFP to compensate.  In Ireland, the 
manufacturer must offer a rebate of 3% PPP to the Primary Care Trust (PCT) 
Schemes for all drugs dispensed under the General Medicines Scheme (GMS). 
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Mandatory pharmacy rebates and discounts 
Pharmacies may also be obliged to offer discounts or rebates to public payers 
such as health authorities or health insurance funds (Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, UK).  In Austria, pharmacies generating annual 
turnover greater than the median community pharmacy turnover with Sickness 
Funds (SF) must grant a 2.5% discount on products priced less than €200 (at 
PPP level) to the SF.  
In Germany, off-patent drugs have a 10% EFP discount from pharmacies to the 
Social Health Insurance (SHI) funds, in addition to rebates of €2.30/pack for 
prescription only medicines (POM) and 5% for non-POM.  Manufacturers must 
also offer the SHI a 10% rebate for generic medicines.  In Spain, the deductions 
depend on monthly pharmacy turnover (based on PRP, including VAT), and 
account for approximately 4% of sales.  Italy also has a pharmacy clawback 
calculated based on the pharmacy turnover and location of the pharmacy 
(urban/rural), which makes their linear mark-up system regressive via these 
clawbacks. 
In Denmark, there is a ‘solidarity contribution’ that is re-distributed nationally to 
level out pharmacy earnings based solely on pharmacy sales (regardless of its 
population base) in order to ensure rural access to pharmacies.   
In Finland, pharmacies grant war veterans a 10% discount, and private 
pharmacies pay the state 6.6% of their turnover (or to the university if they are a 
university pharmacy).  In the UK and the Netherlands, pharmacies have an 
amount deducted from their reimbursement (approximately 10%, known as 
clawback) depending on its turnover. Further, reimbursement prices are 
reviewed depending on pharmacy margins.   
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of flat rate linear pharmacy markups across EU27 Member 
States. 
50.2
46.7
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Source: Markup/Margin regulation as described in Table 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.3: Average pharmacy margin/markups presented across EU27 Countries.  
Greater than one source (2007-2010) creates minimum and maximum values.  
Countries with * have private negotiations, ‘R’ denotes regressive markup/margins and 
‘L’ denotes linear markups. 
Average Pharmacy Margins presented across EU27 Countries.  Greater than one 
source (2007-2010) creates minimum and maximum values. Countries with R' 
denote regressive margins and 'L' denotes linear markups.
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Source: Authors’ compilation and AESGP 2009, ÖBIG 2007, PPRI Country Profiles, 
GÖG/ÖBIG survey with authorities and stakeholders 
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4.3. Concluding remarks 
The discussion from the preceding sections has highlighted that: 
• First, the majority of Member States applies regulated margins to both or 
the pharmacy sector only for the reimbursement market. Often, 
markups/margins are applied for all medicines. They are designed as 
maximum markups/margins. 
• Second, regressive markups/margins are very common, but some 
countries also apply linear markups/margins. For pharmacies, dispensing 
fees are used in a few countries, and in one country (Slovenia) 
pharmacies are funded on a fee-for-service remuneration. 
• Third, average wholesale margins range from 2-24% of PRP (low in 
Sweden, high in the Netherlands, both unregulated private negotiations), 
with the majority ranging between 4-8% of PRP.   
• Fourth, considerably less information is available regarding the average 
pharmacy margin in a country, however, for the 15 countries for which 
average pharmacy margins could be surveyed, the range is 12-50% of 
PRP (low in Romania, high in Luxembourg).   
• Fifth, what is made apparent in this section is the diversity of the methods 
of establishing wholesale and pharmacy/retail remuneration. There are 
different markup/margin schemes for reimbursable and non-
reimbursable medicines in a few countries, specific schemes for other 
retailers of prescription medicines in the very few countries in which 
such other retailers operate and a specific incentive for dispensing 
generics in one country (France). 
• Sixth, discounts and rebates play an important role in defining the precise 
amount of wholesale and pharmacy remuneration. On the one hand, in 
several countries commercial discounts (offered by manufacturers to 
wholesalers, by wholesalers to pharmacies, by manufacturers to 
pharmacies, and in some cases by pharmacies to patients) are granted, 
and in a few cases they are limited by regulation. The exact amount of 
these discounts and rebates is confidential. On the other hand, 
wholesalers and, in particular, pharmacies are obliged to grant discounts 
and rebates to public payers in nine countries (known as “clawback” or 
“solidarity contribution”).  
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5. Impact of Wholesale and Retail Margins on the Prices of 
Prescription Medicines: A Payer Perspective 
5.1 Drug Selection and Methodology 
In order to assess the impact of wholesale and retail distribution 
margins/markups on the prices of prescription pharmaceutical products that 
health care systems pay in the EU Member States, an analysis of pricing data was 
conducted.  For this purpose, seven molecules and their prices were selected 
across EU-27. Prices were available at ex-factory (EFP) level, wholesale 
(pharmacy purchase price, PPP) level, and retail (pre-VAT net pharmacy retail 
price, net PRP) level. The highest branded and the lowest-priced product 
(generic or parallel imported versions available for 6 out of the seven molecules) 
were selected for each molecule and across EU-27. The available price 
observations related 15 June 2009 and price information was obtained with the 
assistance of the Member States.  
Based on the prices of the medicines selected, we classified these as lower-priced 
(LP), medium-priced (MP) and high-priced (HP). The medicines were selected 
based on their price levels, but also based on their availability across EU27, in 
order to ensure the widest possible levels of comparability.  
Four lower-priced (LP) medicines selected from the broad therapeutic classes 
of  
• hypertension (HT) (LP-HT-50 mg 28 days),  
• gastroenterology (GERD) (LP-GERD-20 mg 28 days),  
• depression (D) (LP-D-20 mg 30 days) and  
• dislipidemia (HC) (LP-HC-20 mg 28 days). 
Two medium-priced (MP) medicines selected from the broad therapeutic 
classes of 
• cardiovascular disease (CVD) (MP-CVD-75 mg 28 days) and  
• psychiatry (S) (MP-S-10 mg 28 days). 
One high-priced (HP) medicine was selected from the therapeutic class of  
• autoimmune diseases (A)(HP-A, 25mg 4 day pack, branded only)  
Not all pack sizes were the same across countries, so the most common pack size 
was chosen and in some cases data were adjusted upwards or downwards as 
needed using unit (pill or capsule) price. This ensured that the price per pack 
was uniform across all Member States for which data was available.  The one 
month pack size is the most dominant in this analysis, however, for some chronic 
conditions larger pack sizes may be available (i.e. 3 months) which may have 
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even lower EFP.  It is important to note that these medicines are not completely 
representative of the entire market, however, they do provide an example of 
what occurs in the distribution chain with some medicines in specified countries.   
The distribution information presented in Section 4 was conjoined with the data 
in this section in order to understand the impact of wholesale and retail margins 
on final net retail prices payable by public payers.  The prices received from the 
Member States were benchmarked against the distribution database discussed in 
the previous section for cross-comparison purposes and found to agree within a 
95% confidence interval.  A number of caveats applied in conducting this 
analysis, for instance: 
• It became apparent that in the price data received, certain countries had 
not added dispensing fees (Belgium, Netherlands, Poland, UK) when very 
low priced generics were examined as the retail price was lower than the 
dispensing fees, thus dispensing fees were added to prices in these 
countries. 
• In certain cases ex-factory (Denmark, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, UK) or wholesale (Czech Republic) prices were not 
included as due to the pricing and markup/margin regulatory framework 
(e.g. joint markup in the Czech Republic, not regulated wholesale markup, 
see Table 4.1), in which case they were extrapolated using the country 
average margins from the distribution database (Tables 4.1, 4.2).   
• The Austrian prices given reflected only the private client prices and not 
the public prices to which a different pharmacy remuneration system is 
applied.   
• In Italy, very expensive medicines are now distributed via hospitals and 
local health units.   
• It was impossible to extract wholesale or retail prices for Malta, as only 
final retail prices were given.   
In the section that follows the impact of distribution margins/markups across 
EU27 is presented. For simplicity, figures in this part of the report include data 
for 3 medicines, showcasing the high-priced medicine for auto-immune 
conditions (HP-A), a mid-medicine priced for psychiatry (MP-S) and a lower-
priced medicine for dislipidemia (LP-HC) medicines from the sample. Appendix 3 
pictorially shows price build-ups for all medicines, including their construction 
and Member State ranking along each stage of the process. For a number of 
cases, particularly pertaining to generic medicines, prices are not available for all 
Member States, as the medicine in question may not have become generic. All 
prices were translated into Euros using the second quarter average exchange 
rates where applicable. 
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5.2 Results of Price Comparisons 
5.2.1 Branded Medicines 
As discussed in the methods section, the prices of the branded medicines 
selected originate from the highest priced brand for each selected medicine in 
each country.  The price gap at EFP levels and the various margins/markups, 
presented in (a) absolute values and (b) as percent of net Pharmacy Retail Price 
(PRP), can be significant between countries.   
For expensive medicines such as HP-A, the price gap between the highest and 
lowest priced countries in absolute terms is 93% for EFP, and 79% when 
wholesale margin/markups are added, 85% when pharmacy margin/markups 
are added (Figure 5.1).  For mid-priced medicines, the price gap between the 
highest and lowest priced countries respectively in absolute terms is 104% and 
250% for absolute EFP, 97% and 260% wholesale margin/markup, 144% and 
187% pharmacy margin/markup.  For low priced medicines, the price gap 
between highest and lowest priced countries respectively is 364% / 2,206%/ 
 410%/  968% for absolute EFP, 354%/ 2,183%/ 441%/  1,029% wholesale 
margin/markup, 284%/ 1,855%/ 325%/ 873% pharmacy margin/markup 
respectively. 
The impact of distribution costs and taxation on health systems and payers also 
seems to vary significantly by drug cost category. For branded LP-HC, the cost to 
payer can be as high as 60% of the retail price, while the average cost to payer 
lies in the region of 30 – 40% of retail price (Figure 5.1). For branded MP-S and 
HP-A, the cost to payer is somewhat less, the highest being 35% and 43% 
respectively, although, typically, the average lies between 25 – 35% (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 
Presentation of branded HP-A (expensive), MP-S (mid-priced) and LP-HC (low priced) 
ex-factory price (EFP), wholesale (WS) margin/markup, pharmacy (Ph) margin/markup 
across 27 EU Member States; prices as of 15 June 2009. 
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Note: Data for Malta, Latvia and Lithuania not available. 
 Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from Member States. 
HP-A, Branded (25 mg, 4 day pack) 
MP-S, Branded (10 mg, 28 day pack) 
LP-HC, Branded (20 mg, 28 day pack) 
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Branded Medicines: Highest and lowest absolute price levels 
This section and the next provide a brief account of where prices (in absolute 
and relative terms respectively) are highest and lowest. Similarly, they provide 
an account of the highest and lowest wholesale and retail margins in Euro terms 
with a view to enabling a comparative account.  
Among the 7 selected medicines, identification of the top three net PRP and its 
constituents (EFP, wholesale and pharmacy margins), found a number of 
patterns between Member States. The EFP was highest in most of these countries 
(Denmark 5 medicines, Germany 3, Bulgaria 2) with the addition of Ireland (3), 
Czech Republic (3) and Estonia (3).  Lowest EFPs were found most frequently in 
the UK, Finland, Romania, Spain, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
Wholesale margins were (in absolute Euro terms) highest in Ireland (7 cases), 
Cyprus (7) and the Netherlands (4), while pharmacy margins were (in absolute 
Euro terms) highest in the Netherlands (6 cases), Ireland (5), Belgium (3), 
Germany (2) and Greece (2). Wholesale margins were lowest in Finland (5 
cases), Sweden (4), Czech Republic (2), Estonia (2) and Spain (2).  Pharmacy 
margins were lowest in the UK (6 cases), Lithuania (4), Slovenia (4), Romania (2) 
and Spain (2).  For the UK, the pricing situation reflects the impact of exchange 
rates combined with one price cut, which is reflected in the pricing data for the 
selected molecules. 
Overall, the general trend is for high or low EFPs to be transferred through to the 
final net retail (PRP) price.  Countries with high wholesale margins also appear 
to have high pharmacy margins (i.e. the Netherlands and Ireland), while this 
does not hold in the case of low wholesale margins. Denmark and Germany have 
the highest EFPs and PRPs, while the UK, Finland, Romania and Spain the lowest. 
 
Total impact of distribution costs: branded medicines 
The final net average costs of distribution for HP-A is €89.75 (range €11.50-
320.77, Estonia – Cyprus), for MP-CVD €13.18 (range €4.43-35.18, Slovenia-
Austria), for MP-S €25.13 (range €5.98-89.96, Hungary-Ireland), LP-HT €7.09 
(range €1.81-14.02, Lithuania-Ireland), LP-GERD €9.83 (€1.22-20.97, Spain-
Ireland), LP-D €6.36 (€1.50-13.34, Lithuania-Germany), LP-HC €5.34 (€1.41-
17.93, Spain-Ireland).  These wide ranges in total net distribution margins 
reinforce the notion of significant variation in distribution costs between EU 
Member States. 
Closer examination of the ranking of countries during the build-up of prices from 
EFP to PPP to net PRP shows that the impact of margins can change the final 
price to payers significantly.  Examination of HP-A (Figure 5.2) shows that 
although the highest and lowest ranked countries remain the same during the 
process, some countries can decrease significantly in their rankings (i.e. 
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Luxembourg) and others can increase (ie Greece, Italy) due to lower or higher 
respective influence of margins on EFP. Appendix 3 shows similar graphs for 
each medicine, both branded and generic. 
 
Figure 5.2 
HP-A: Building of EFP (1st panel), PPP (2nd), and net PRP (3rd) across EU27 Member 
States, with ranking of Member States during each stage of the process, as of 15 June 
2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta, Lithuania and Poland not available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from Member States.  
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5.2.2 Generic Medicines 
The prices of generic medicines across the products selected originate from the 
lowest priced generic product in the country.  HP-A is not presented as it is only 
available as an originator.  As with branded medicines, the range of prices and 
margins/markups are significant between the Member States, particularly for 
wholesale margins and low priced medicines (Figure 5.3).   
For MP-CVD and MP-S, the price gaps between the highest and lowest priced 
countries respectively are 252% and 353% absolute EFP, 256% and 365% 
wholesale margin/markup, 243% and 363% pharmacy margin/markup 
respectively.  For LP-HT, LP-GERD, LP-D and LP-HC, the price gaps are 
7483%/3175%/1811%/8610% gross EFP, 7807%/2797%/1648%/9177% 
wholesale margin/markup, 782%/1117%/622%/1838% pharmacy 
margin/markup, respectively.  These wide variations mimic the variations found 
in the branded versions albeit exponentially. 
The impact of distribution costs on health systems and payers also seems to vary 
significantly in the generics case as it does in the branded medicines case, 
although the variation in this case is far greater than in branded medicines (as 
shown on Figure 5.3). The structure of wholesale and retail margins does mean 
that in certain (extreme) cases the impact of distribution costs and taxation 
exceeds 90% of the total cost to payer and the average seems to be higher than 
in the case of branded medicines. 
 
Generic Medicines: Highest and lowest absolute price levels 
Identification of top three absolute prices found high EFP in Germany (3 
medicines), Greece (3), as well as Cyprus (3) and Denmark (3).  High wholesale 
margins were found in Cyprus (4 medicines), Ireland (3) and the Netherlands 
(3), while high pharmacy margins were found in Germany (4), Ireland (3), 
Denmark (2) and the Netherlands (2).   
Lowest EFP were found in Sweden (4), Netherlands (3), Bulgaria (2), Denmark 
(2) and Estonia (2).  Lowest wholesale margins in generics were found in 
Sweden (5 medicines), Finland (3), Czech Republic (2) and Latvia (2), while 
lowest pharmacy margins were identified in Lithuania (4), Romania (3) and the 
Netherlands (2). 
Overall, high EFPs are usually transferred all the way through to high gross PRP 
(Denmark, Germany, Greece), as well as reflected in high wholesale (Cyprus, 
Ireland) and pharmacy margins (Denmark, Germany).  This trend was also found 
in countries with low EFP (Sweden, Denmark, Estonia).   
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 Figure 5.3: Presentation of generic MP-S and LP-HC ex-factory price (EFP), wholesale 
(WS) margin/markup, and pharmacy (Ph) margin/markup across 27 EU Member States, 
as of 15 June 2009 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
E
s
t
o
n
ia
L
a
t
v
ia
P
o
la
n
d
 
F
in
la
n
d
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
S
w
e
d
e
n
N
e
t
h
e
rl
a
n
d
s
C
y
p
ru
s
D
e
n
m
a
rk
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
G
e
rm
a
n
y
A
u
s
t
ri
a
B
e
lg
iu
m
C
z
e
c
h
F
ra
n
c
e
G
re
e
c
e
H
u
n
g
a
ry
Ir
e
la
n
d
It
a
ly
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
M
a
lt
a
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
R
o
m
a
n
ia
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
S
p
a
in
U
K
(
Ū
EFP W S M argin Ph M argin (incl Dispensing Fee)
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
F
in
la
n
d
U
K
D
e
n
m
a
rk
S
w
e
d
e
n
R
o
m
a
n
ia
S
p
a
in
P
o
la
n
d
 
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
C
z
e
c
h
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
H
u
n
g
a
ry
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
N
e
t
h
e
rl
a
n
d
s
L
a
t
v
ia
It
a
ly
G
e
rm
a
n
y
E
s
t
o
n
ia
B
e
lg
iu
m
A
u
s
t
ri
a
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
F
ra
n
c
e
C
y
p
ru
s
G
re
e
c
e
Ir
e
la
n
d
M
a
lt
a
(
€
)
(
€
)
(
€
)
(
€
)
EFP W S M argin Ph M argin (incl Dispensing Fee)
 
Note: Data for several Member States not available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from Member States. 
 
Total impact of distribution costs: generic medicines 
The net average distribution costs for MP-CVD were €8.60 (range €3.42-15.64, 
Hungary-Netherlands), for MP-S €16.21 (range €3.10-51.06, Lithuania-Cyprus), 
for LP-HT €4.24 (range €1.05-10.52, Romania-Netherlands), LP-GERD €4.70 
MP-S, Generic (10 mg, 28 day pack) 
LP-HC, Generic (20 mg, 28 day pack) 
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(€0.94-13.76, Spain-Ireland), LP-D €4.86 (€1.30-14.18, Bulgaria-Belgium) and 
for LP-HC €3.76 (€0.87-13.27, Finland-Ireland).  Again, as with branded 
medicines, it appears there is significant variation between EU Member States in 
their distribution costs. 
 
Figure 5.4  LP-HC (generic): EFP, PPP, and net PRP across EU27 Member States, as of 15 
June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta not available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from Member States. 
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Examination of the least expensive generic medicine presented, LP-HC, also finds 
that the impact of distribution costs has significant impact on the final price to 
payers (Figure 5.4).  Furthermore, for a number of countries, it appears that the 
distribution costs consume the majority of the final net price (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK).  In the case of Belgium and Germany, their 
overall net PRP is in the top third prices, the Netherlands is approximately 
middle of the range, while for the remaining countries they offer some of the 
lowest net PRP in the EU.  It could be, in these cases, that the proportional 
greater distribution costs in relation to the EFP are needed to offset the lesser 
profits gained by their branded counterparts. 
In addition, as with the branded medicines, although the majority of countries 
rank the same throughout the exercise there are some that change dramatically 
during the process.  For example, the Netherlands have one of the lowest EFP, 
however, the addition of wholesale and pharmacy margins immediately push it 
up to middle of pack.  There are other countries which also change from the top 
third to the lower third (or vice versa) although not as dramatically as the 
Netherlands. 
 
5.3. Concluding remarks 
There are a number of messages to take away from this price comparison and 
build-up.   
• First, it appears that there is a wide range in prices at each stage of the 
exercise from EFP to gross PRP between EU27 Member States.  This price 
spread is significantly more apparent in generic medicines than it is in 
branded, and far more apparent in less expensive medicines than more 
expensive medicines. This evidences the impact of regressive 
margin/margin schemes which are in place in several countries. 
• Second, although EFP appears to some extent to predict approximately 
the final gross PRP to the payer, this is not always the case.  Countries 
such as Greece, Italy and Luxembourg for branded medicines, and the 
Netherlands for generic medicines saw dramatic changes in their ranking 
with addition of wholesale and pharmacy margins. 
• Third, it appears that the application of distribution margins may be 
different between branded and generic medicines, in some countries in 
particular.  Countries with consistently low EFP, in some cases less than 5 
percent of the final gross PRP, were Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden – of interest these countries also had low relative 
EFP for their branded counterparts.   
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6. Diversity in the Distribution System and Issues Arising 
It emerges from the previous sections that there is a significant level of diversity 
in the operation of both wholesaling and retailing across the EU. The following 
paragraphs summarise a number of interesting cases based on individual 
Member State experience and outline some of the issues they face. The selection 
of Member States for this purpose has been arbitrary, but has been facilitated by 
recent developments in distribution. 
 
6.1. United Kingdom 
6.1.1. Key trends 
Wholesale margins in the UK are unregulated and determined through private 
negotiations between manufacturers and wholesalers.  It is estimated this 
margin is no more than 12.5% (an unwritten “agreement” but widely understood 
to be the case).  The pharmacy margin is also unregulated (formally), and a flat 
dispensing fee of €1.52 is one the margins added to pharmacy remuneration (see 
below).  Other fees may also be collected via additional services, such as low-
level diagnostics and basic counseling services. Pharmacy remuneration is 
determined, in fact, negotiated between government and pharmacy and includes 
payment terms alongside service provisions. 
Application of margins across the seven selected molecules and the resulting  
branded and generic products, found that generally the UK has the lowest or 
amongst the lowest-third prices across the Member States for both branded and 
generic medicines1, with the exception of branded LP-HC (Appendix 3).  
Generally, regardless of price class, a low EFP transfers through to a low net and 
gross PRP. 
Pharmacy remuneration is covered by the Contractual Framework (operating 
since 2005) and pays pharmacies via a global sum budget from the Department 
of Health (DH) through fees and allowances (£1,049 million 2008-09), via 
practice payments in the form of dispensing fees in larger pharmacies and 
monthly payments from Primary Care Trusts (PCT) in smaller pharmacies (£664 
million 2008-09), and via retained margins from the difference in price between 
the PPP and the NHS reimbursement price and set at £500 million annually 
(£770 million, 2008-09) (NAO, 2010).  The majority of pharmacies are paid via 
                                                           
1 This is a fairly recent development (evolving gradually over the past 3 years), reflecting a 
combination of two effects: first, two consecutive PPRS agreements, one in January 2006 and one 
in January 2009, both of which were associated with an across the board price cut; second, 
during this period, sterling depreciated significantly against the Euro, from €1.42 per £ to less 
than €1.1 per £. This combined effect made UK prices among the lowest in the EU in 2009, 
compared with among the highest 7-8 years earlier. 
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the practice payments, and only a small minority of isolated small pharmacies 
are paid via the essential small pharmacies scheme.  The UK is, along with the 
Netherlands, one of the countries that explicitly allows discount income as part 
of overall pharmacy income. As part of this process, the government also retains 
part of the discount income through a process known as the clawback. 
The higher than expected retained margin income is principally related to lower 
than forecasted PPP due to pharmacy incentives to drive purchase prices down.  
With new information, the retained margin calculation drives NHS 
reimbursement prices down, which then encourages further discounts by 
pharmacies.  This regulatory lag is implicitly included in the agreement between 
the Pharmaceutical Services Negotiating Committee (PSNC) and the Department 
of Health. 
 
6.1.2. Issues in distribution 
The main wholesalers in the UK are Celesio, Alliance Healthcare, Phoenix and 
Mawdsley-Brooks. National wholesalers occupy the main source of 
pharmaceuticals (93%), while regional wholesalers are a minority.  However, 
approximately 11% of medicines are delivered by short-line wholesalers (GIRP 
Database, 2010). The wholesale distribution model has undergone significant 
changes in the past 4-5 years with the evolution of agency and reduced 
wholesaler arrangements. One of the implications is that, as a result, full-line 
wholesaling is declining and short-line wholesaling is on the ascendancy. 
Wholesalers typically offer up to half or – according to meetings with them – 
more of their margin (of 12.5%) to pharmacy for branded medicines. 
The UK offers one of the least restrictive government environments of 
pharmacies between Member States: discounts from wholesalers to pharmacies 
are allowed, chains and non-pharmacy ownership are allowed, and no control of 
location exists (only for non-NHS contracts).  Further, most pharmacies offer 
additional services such as blood glucose testing and emergency contraception, 
sometimes at no cost to the patient. 
 
6.2. Greece 
6.2.1. Key trends 
Greece applies a flat wholesaler markup of 8.43% EFP to all reimbursed 
medicines, in addition to a flat pharmacy markup of 35% PPP.  Mandatory 
discounts are applied to manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers based on rural 
location (population <5,000).  No additional dispensing fees or other fees are 
collected.  
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Application of Greek margins across the seven molecules finds generally that 
Greece has the highest or amongst the highest generic prices across the Member 
States, although a number of generic medicines were not represented by Greece 
in the dataset.  These high generic prices start with the EFP and continue all the 
way through to the net and gross PRP.  The expensive class example of HP-A 
found a mid-range EFP, however, the application of wholesale and pharmacy 
margins created a top 5 finish, suggesting a high impact of distribution on 
insurance costs of medicines.   
6.2.2. Issues in distribution 
The five largest wholesalers in Greece are Alapis SA, Sypfa Salonica, Stroumsas I 
SA, Prosyfape and Syneterismos Peiraios.  Approximately 15% of medicines 
bypass the wholesalers and are directly delivered to the pharmacies which is 
amongst the highest rate between Member States (GIRP Database, 2010). 
Wholesalers seem to have a spatial (geographical) monopoly, originating from 
the geographical peculiarities of the country (over 65% being mountainous and 
difficult to have easy road access; several thousand islands, many of which are 
inhabited with small populations), although it is not certain how recent 
developments and infrastructure investment have been taken into account in re-
shaping that policy. 
Pharmacy ownership remains very restrictive, with only pharmacists allowed to 
be owners, no chains are allowed and locations strictly regulated.  Despite that, 
the country has the largest density of pharmacies within the EU. Pharmacies are 
the only licensed vendors for both prescription only and over-the-counter 
medicines, including food supplements. Based on interviews with wholesalers, a 
significant part of their margin (approximately 2/3) is passed on as a discount to 
pharmacies. Pharmacies have also set up cooperatives, ie wholesaler 
arrangements to enable them to procure cost-effectively from suppliers of 
medicines. Some of the largest wholesalers are cooperatives. 
 
6.3. Spain 
6.3.1. Key trends 
Spain has regressive margins both for wholesale and pharmacy remuneration. 
Prior to July 2010, two scales would apply to each of wholesale and pharmacy 
remuneration: for medicines with a manufacturer price of up to €91.63, there 
was a margin expressed as a percentage of the wholesale and pharmacy retail 
price respectively; and for higher priced medicines a fixed amount was added. In 
July 2010, the pharmacy margin scheme was changed, by adding two further 
scales (the first applying to medicines priced between € 200.- and € 500.- and 
the second applying to medicines priced above € 500.-) to which a fixed 
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remuneration sum was added. This is one measure in reaction to the financial 
crisis, in addition to price cuts for generics and discounts for higher-priced 
medicines (see below). 
Average wholesale margins are between 3-5%. Only commercial discounts may 
be applied between wholesaler and pharmacy. 
At pharmacy level, Spain applies a clawback system, with pharmacies making 
payments based on a percentage of their annual sales of reimbursable medicines 
at manufacturer prices. This clawback system has been in place since August 
2000, while changes to the operation of the system came into effect in 2004, in 
February 2005 and May 2008 and, more recently, in July 2010. 
This latest change in July 2010 to address the financial crisis provided, instead of 
price cuts, for discounts by the stakeholders to the regions for original products 
(7.5%) and orphan medicines (4%). While the discounts entered into force in 
June 2010, it took, according to Spanish experts, some months until the decision 
about the exact sharing of the burden for each of the stakeholders was reached. 
The exact handling of the implementation was still unclear at the end of 2010. 
Application of margins across the seven molecules found Spain to be consistently 
amongst the lowest for branded LP-HT, MP-S (plus generic version) and LP-HC 
which all represent low-priced medicines, as well as the lower third for 
expensive HP-A.  The remaining medicines, both branded and generic, were 
generally close to the average amongst EU Member States.  Further, most 
medicines followed generally along the same path, with no huge swings from 
EFP to net and gross PRP. 
6.3.2. Issues in distribution 
The five largest wholesalers in Spain are Cofares, Alliance Healthcare, Hefame, 
Cecofar and Federacio.  Regional wholesalers (55 companies) command the 
largest part of the market share at 58%, in comparison with other Member 
States where national wholesalers are the minority, yet occupy the position of 
key distributors (GIRP 2010).  Most of these regional wholesalers are owned by 
pharmacist-owned co-operatives controlling 75% of the market; only one 
wholesaler is owned by a foreign entity (SAFA; 14% market share). 
There are several restrictions in operation of the distribution channel, as such 
there is no vertical or horizontal integration – all pharmacies are owned by 
pharmacists and no pharmacies are part of a chain (ÖBIG, 2006).  However, there 
are buying groups (approx. 25 groups, each with 50 members) to help with 
purchase prices.  Further, the market is very fragmented (expressed by the 
dominance of regional wholesalers) partly reflecting the organizational structure 
of the country with emphasis on the autonomous communities (regions).   The 
number of pharmacies per inhabitant has increased significantly over the past 
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decade, which means existing pharmacies may be having issues with sufficient 
medicine stocks. 
 
6.4. Sweden 
6.4.1. Key trends 
Sweden has an unregulated, privately negotiated wholesale market, which is 
estimated on average at 2-3% of EFP.  No mandatory discounts exist but 
commercial discounts do exist from wholesalers to pharmacies.  The pharmacy 
margins on the other hand are regressive, using 4 categories ranging from less 
than €8.08 to greater than €646.40 PPP, with an average of 21.3%.  No 
pharmacy dispensing fees exist and VAT on public reimbursed medicines is zero. 
Examination of margins across the seven molecules found generic medicines 
were the lowest or amongst the lowest prices from EFP through to net and gross 
PRP.  Branded medicines tended to remain in the middle of the pack all the way 
through the margin building exercise.  The expensive HP-A began with a mid-
range EFP and ended in a bottom 6 net PRP and bottom 3 gross PRP price. 
6.4.2. Issues in distribution 
The two main wholesalers in Sweden are Tamro and KD who occupy 95% of the 
market share (no regional wholesalers exist). It has a single-channel distribution 
system, which is nearly unique across EU Member States; such a model of 
organizing wholesale distribution can only be found in Sweden and Finland. In a 
single channel system the wholesaler has the exclusive right to distribute 
medicines for a manufacturer. It has been evidenced that wholesalers in single-
channel systems have a stronger market power than the ones in multi-channel 
systems (ÖBIG 2003). This might impact prices and raises concerns regarding 
the lack of competition in this sector. 
Sweden is one of the few countries that allows internet distribution2. 
From 1971 to 2009 the Swedish state owned all pharmacies, as only a state 
owned pharmacy chain (“Apoteket”) existed. Sweden was one of the few 
countries world-wide with a pharmacy monopoly. Many attempts (approx. 30 
commissions) have been undertaken to abandon the monopoly, but these were 
unsuccessful. In addition, the Swedish pharmacy monopoly has been challenged 
by the European Commission. After the general elections in 2006, the Swedish 
government decided to implement a new commission aiming to deregulate the 
                                                           
2
 Alongside the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia, and Poland  
(see Table 3.1.) 
 69
pharmacy sector by 2009. In July 2009 the new regulation developed in 
collaboration with the pharmaceutical industry went into force. 
Since then many players have entered the pharmacy sector as “anyone” can own 
a pharmacy, except for prescribers and pharmaceutical companies. Some chains 
have also entered this market. Some government-owned pharmacies still remain 
organised in a franchising system. Two DocMorris pharmacies have already 
emerged in Sweden and some food chains also own pharmacies. By June 2010 
about 50% of the state pharmacies were sold to other owners and and the 
remaining 50% are still and continue to be under public control. An increase in 
numbers from 800, prior to the deregulation to 1,300 is expected to change due 
to market stabilization. 
The goals of the deregulation in Sweden, which some experts prefer referring to 
as “re-regulation”, are increased accessibility (to extend opening hours), better 
service and more differentiated services. Among the goals and mission given by 
the Swedish government to the Dental and Pharmaceuticals Benefits Agency 
(TLV), which is in charge of the implemention of this policy, it is also to adjust 
the pharmacy/retail margin. 
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7. Discussion – A Stakeholder Appraisal 
This section considers the stakeholder implications in 5 areas relating to 
distribution policy: first, the changing market structure; second, the recent 
developments in the distribution model in some countries; third, the policies on 
distribution margins and their implications; fourth, the impact of distribution 
margins and markups on retail prices; and, fifth, the likely differential impact of 
margins on brands versus generic medicines. It draws on the evidence presented 
in the previous sections and more widely on meetings and semi-structured 
interviews conducted with a variety of stakeholders, ranging from patient 
groups, health insurance organizations, wholesalers and wholesaler associations, 
pharmacists and pharmacy associations, and manufacturers and manufacturer 
associations from a number of countries (UK, France, Spain, Sweden, Greece, 
Belgium, Switzerland, the Baltics, and The Netherlands). 
 
7.1. The changing market structure 
7.1.1. Key issues 
The majority of countries have regulated wholesale and pharmacy margins, with 
the exception of Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden and 
the UK for the former and Ireland, Netherlands and the UK for the latter.  Despite 
this regulation there appears to be fragmentation nationally and at EU level with 
regards to its organization and structure.  Some countries have monopolistic or 
near monopoly conditions in wholesaling or retailing, or both (ie Denmark, 
Sweden), while others have much higher than average numbers of wholesalers 
(i.e. Italy, Spain, Greece) or pharmacies (Greece, Spain, Italy) relative to their 
population. 
Significant horizontal integration has occurred particularly in the wholesaler 
industry, to the extent that many wholesalers operate throughout regions of the 
EU and the number of wholesalers operating has decreased significantly over the 
past decade.  Pharmacy chains now exist in almost half (13) of the EU, while the 
remainder still have strict regulations on pharmacy ownership, usually entailing 
rules where either a pharmacist may own only one pharmacy or where the 
pharmacist must own a minimum of 51% of the pharmacy.  Despite the 
development of pharmacy chains, or the liberalization of location, in most 
countries the total number of pharmacies has remained relatively stable during 
this decade. Where pharmacy horizontal integration is hindered by national 
regulation, cooperative purchasing schemes have arisen to achieve economies of 
scale and better procurement terms from wholesaling entities. 
 71
A further trend relates to ongoing developments in vertical integration in the 
industry.  In a number of cases, wholesalers and pharmacies have merged to 
form vertically integrated entities and take advantage of any scale economies in 
the wholesale and retail markets. In most cases, such actions are initiated by 
wholesalers, seeking to access the retail market and potentially have access to 
patients and their needs, whereas in others, the opposite occurs and retail 
groups acquire wholesale entities in order to strengthen their backward links 
and procure more efficiently.   
In recent years, manufacturers have assumed a more active role, indirectly 
intervening in the distribution chain and shaping its structure; as a result of 
these “interventions”, in some EU countries 5-20% of prescription medicines 
now bypass wholesalers and are directly delivered to the pharmacy. 
Wholesalers and pharmacies both offer more services than previously due to this 
increased competition.  In the majority of cases, these extra services are not 
charged but absorbed by the relevant company as a business cost.  In a number 
of countries, pharmacies are allowed to offer internet dispensing of prescription 
medicines, in some cases independent of a ‘bricks and mortar’ pharmacy. 
 
7.1.2. Stakeholder perspectives 
Manufacturers 
Manufacturers would in principle be interested in a supply chain that guarantees 
the efficient distribution of their products for the intended markets and at 
reasonable cost. Access to patient information at the micro level (i.e. in 
individual communities) would be key and an area worth investing in. In an era 
of logistics and stock management being driven remotely by advances in 
information and communication technology (ICT), the value-added of certain 
components of the distribution chain have often been questioned in relation to 
the services provided and the overall cost of these services.3 As a result, it is not 
surprising that manufacturers explore alternative (wholesale) distribution 
arrangements. 
 
Wholesaling 
Wholesalers feel squeezed by current practices as well as some recent 
developments. Current practices in wholesaling suggest that wholesalers 
typically offer a proportion (in some cases significant) of their allowable margin 
as a discount to pharmacy. Interviews with wholesaler stakeholders alluded to 
                                                           
3 Interviews with 4 leading manufacturers. 
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actual margins ranging between 1.5 – 3.5%. Pharmacy chains may have greater 
negotiating power and can, as a result, benefit from a higher discount from 
wholesaling, although the extent to which this is true at aggregate level is unclear 
and can be the subject of further scrutiny. 
Competition among wholesalers for the retail business has intensified in recent 
years by developments in IT and logistics, as well as the entry of manufacturers 
who are increasingly interested in establishing direct vertical links with the 
retail business. In some cases, this is resulting in the map of players on the 
market being re-drawn with consolidation of existing entities and entry of others 
or a re-definition of activities by existing players.  
These dynamic developments can have a significant impact on wholesaling and 
the competitive advantages it has in the distribution of medicines. Interviews 
with wholesalers and other stakeholders indicate that the traditional full-line 
wholesaling model (stocking the widest possible gamut of pharmaceutical 
products, easy access to stock by and timely & frequent delivery to retailers) is 
under dispute – indirectly - in a number of Member States, particularly those 
where the environment is more flexible regarding ownership and integration. As 
a result, if wholesaling is to survive it will probably need to develop further 
competences and links downstream strengthening existing advantages. 
Pharmacy 
Retail market structure remains diverse across EU Member States, as does the 
regulatory environment relating to ownwership, procurement and ability to 
integrate both horizontally and vertically. 
Greater efficiencies can be achieved by joint procurement and this can 
materialize through a horizontally or a vertically integrated structure or a 
cooperative. Countries where horizontal or vertical integration are limited by 
current legislation are taking advantage of the “cooperative solution”, e.g. Spain, 
France and Greece.  
Redefining the role of pharmacy is a great pursuit, particularly in what concerns 
health promotion, prevention, aspects of disease management and monitoring. 
There may be considerable benefits to society and the health care system from 
this development in terms of quality, access and cost. Pharmacy chains are likely 
to benefit more from this development in terms of volume, facilities within 
pharmacy and network or population coverage. Yet, the willingness of health 
authorities to pursue this remains sluggish. As evidence from the UK suggests, ‘… 
the new pharmacy contract involves more monitoring, survey and audit; none of 
which is supported by the Department of Health (DoH) or Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs). PCTs do not provide support for health promotion campaigns or clinical 
governance, and the contract never delivered what it promised...’  
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An important competitive advantage of pharmacy, making it an attractive target 
to pursue further consolidation in the field is its direct relationship with the 
patient population and the use by the latter as a source of information and 
advice. This is already driving developments in some Member States and further 
developments are still to come. 
Patients 
Patients are in principle neutral to consolidation in the distribution sector, so 
long as access and availability of medicines are not compromised and the range 
of available services increases at no additional cost to them. Increasing services 
at pharmacy level could prove beneficial particularly if they are offered in a 
timely fashion and avoiding waiting times. In some instances, patients have 
raised questions about access to services and the length of time it takes for them 
to access a pharmacy. This is particularly important for elderly and vulnerable 
patients in rural areas. Where these phenomena exist action could be taken by 
the competent authorities to ensure that access remains at acceptable levels. 
Where pharmacy chains occupy a significant proportion of retail distribution 
access problems in rural areas could be addressed by operating chain outlets in 
problem areas. 
 
Insurers and payers 
From a payer perspective, greater consolidation could mean lower distribution 
costs because of economies of scale in procurement and distribution, taking 
advantage of common networks and more efficient operations. In theory, 
consolidation would imply lower fixed costs, but it is questionable whether 
compressing these can be achieved ad infinitum. It may even be doubtful 
whether cost reductions can be achieved in the first place given the changing 
patterns in the distribution of medicines and the increasing proliferation of 
agency and reduced wholesaler models.  
But even if these models are not taken into account for a moment, it is likely that 
the environment in the distribution chain is becoming more competitive with 
payers demanding greater generic dispensing (and, therefore, at a lower overall 
margin) and driving the market for generic products, as it has recently been seen 
with outpatient tendering in some countries (the Netherlands, Germany and 
Hungary, among others).  Such developments are unlikely to enable further 
sustainable reductions in margins without having an impact on market structure 
of distribution.  
Additional services that can be provided by retail pharmacies could go some way 
to maintain existing structures, yet, it is not always clear what additional value 
these services create and what an adequate remuneration is as a result. For 
instance, health promotion campaigns, monitoring, audit, or clinical governance 
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could be undertaken by pharmacies, yet, a number of stakeholders at national 
and regional level have suggested that they cannot support financially these 
services. 
In an environment characterized by consolidation, payers need to be mindful 
that access to pharmacies is maintained overall, particularly in rural areas, which 
are, in principle, under-provided. In areas where there seems to be a problem, 
rural pharmacies can be offered financial incentives to continue operating for the 
benefit of the wider community they serve.  
 
7.2. Changes to the prevailing distribution model 
7.2.1. Issues in supply chain arrangements 
Some of the changes outlined in the previous section on market structure 
relating to horizontal integration (among retailers or among wholesaler entities) 
and vertical integration (between agents across the distribution chain) are to a 
certain degree also propagated by changes in the type of the distribution model 
over the past 3-4 years with the emergence of agency and reduced wholesaler 
arrangements in some countries as discussed in section 3.  
Both types of models are gaining momentum in a number of EU countries for an 
increasing number of products, particularly expensive prescription drugs. This 
development does not necessarily contravene the public service obligation. 
Article 81 of Directive 2001/83/EC outlines the public service obligation 
requirements (and potential limitations thereof) suggesting that “… with regard 
to the supply of medicinal products to pharmacists and persons authorised or 
entitled to supply medicinal products to the public, Member States shall not 
impose upon the holder of a distribution authorisation which has been granted 
by another Member State any obligation, in particular public service obligations, 
more stringent than those they impose on persons whom they have themselves 
authorised to engage in equivalent activities. Further, in the Official Journal of 
the European Union “… the holder of a marketing authorisation for a medicinal 
product and the distributors of the said medicinal product actually placed on the 
market in a Member State shall, within the limits of their responsibilities, ensure 
appropriate and continued supplies of that medicinal product to pharmacies and 
persons authorised to supply medicinal products so that the needs of patients in 
the Member State in question are covered. The arrangements for implementing 
this Article should, moreover, be justified on grounds of public health protection 
and be proportionate in relation to the objective of such protection, in 
compliance with the Treaty rules, particularly those concerning the free 
movement of goods and competition” (L136/50 EN 30 April 2004). 
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The interpretation of the above varies in the Member States, with the “public 
service obligation” at times being called into question, although, by and large, it 
does not restrict the parallel operation of different distribution models. To that 
end, agency (or Direct-To-Pharmacy, DTP) arrangements can co-exist with 
reduced wholesaler arrangements, where manufacturers can completely (in the 
case of agency) or partly (in the case of a reduced wholesaler model), or a 
combination thereof, bypass the traditional chain to supply pharmacies directly. 
At the same time, they limit (in the case of a reduced wholesaler model) or 
altogether eliminate (in the case of the agency model) the discounting ability by 
wholesaler to pharmacy. From a practical perspective the developments on this 
front have meant that the concept of a full-line wholesaler is redundant, as for 
example, different distribution arrangements may be in operation for different 
products within a manufacturer’s portfolio. 
Indeed, as Table 7.1 shows by drawing on the UK environment, manufacturers 
may have more than one type of relationship with wholesalers.  Reduced 
wholesaler arrangements exist in 18 out of 23 main manufacturers in the UK and 
the remaining 5 manufacturers have agency model arrangements with 3 major 
pan-European wholesalers (Alliance Healthcare, AAH and Phoenix).  This 
reduced wholesaler relationship is present for all prescription medicines in 3 
cases and for all products in 4 cases, while the remaining 11 cases are applied to 
selected products.  The agency model is present for selected products in 3 cases, 
for all products in one case and prescription medicines in another case.  Of the 
23 manufacturers, 22 have relationship with Alliance Healthcare, 17 with AAH 
and 13 with Phoenix. 
The above has given rise to a number of issues for the different stakeholders; 
these relate to the type of complex arrangements that are in place, the access 
issues that arise, the income and profitability of different stakeholders, the 
efficient operation of the market, the effects on competition and the likely impact 
of product shortages. These are explored in the paragraphs that follow from a 
stakeholder angle. 
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Table 7.1 
Overview of supply chain arrangements between manufacturers and pan-European wholesalers, April 2010 
Manufacturer Effective from Type of Arrangement Products Available Alliance 
Healthcare 
AAH Phoenix 
Pfizer Mar 2007 Agency model All prescription medicines     
NAPP Oct 2007 Reduced wholesaler All products    
Sanofi-aventis Nov 2007 Reduced wholesaler All products    
Astellas Nov 2007 Agency model Selected products    
AstraZeneca Feb 2008 Agency model All products    
Novartis Aug 2008 Reduced wholesaler All prescription medicines    
GlaxoSmithKline Nov 2008 Agency model All prescription medicines    
Janssen-Cilag Jan 2009 Reduced wholesaler All prescription medicines    
Roche Products Ltd Jan 2009 Reduced wholesaler Selected prescription medicines    
Novo Nordisk Mar 2009 Reduced wholesaler All products excluding NovoSeven    
UCB Apr 2009 Reduced wholesaler Neupro only    
Smith & Nephew July 2009 Reduced wholesaler All wound management products    
Eli Lilly July 2009 Agency model Check with manufacturer    
Bayer Schering Pharma July 2009 Reduced wholesaler Selected products    
Bristol Myers Squibb Aug 2009 Reduced wholesaler Selected products    
Merck Sharpe & Dohme Oct 2009 Reduced wholesaler All MSD products    
LEO Pharma Oct 2009 Reduced wholesaler All products    
UCB Nov 2009 Reduced wholesaler All products (except Neupro)    
Lifescan UK Dec 2009 Reduced wholesaler One Touch Ulta and Finepoint    
Ferring Pharmaceuticals Jan 2010 Reduced wholesaler All products    
Medac Mar 2010 Reduced wholesaler Metoject    
LALK-Abello Ltd Apr 2010 Reduced wholesaler Epi-Pen and Epi-Pen Junior    
Shire May 2010 Reduced wholesaler Selected products    
Source: British Association of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, September 2010.
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7.2.2. The changing structure and nature of medicines distribution: implications for 
stakeholders 
Access and availability of medicines 
Nowhere else has the changing nature of distribution and the advent of the agency and the 
reduced wholesaler models, had a significant impact than the UK and, to a certain extent, 
the Netherlands. In principle, changes in the distribution model should make the process of 
delivering medicines from factory gates to the patient bed-side leaner (more efficient) and 
cost-effective. Yet, there seem to be some concerns about the availability of medicines; it 
could be the case that manufacturers’ activities in streamlining supplies and managing 
stock coupled with the ever fragmented nature of distribution, can lead to shortages in 
some markets. 
In a survey of 220 pharmacists conducted in August 2010 and published in the Chemist & 
Druggist, extensive reference is made to medicine shortages, attributable to changes in the 
UK pharmaceutical distribution model. According to the survey, as a result of shortages 
patient anxiety levels have increased significantly, particularly in the case of severe 
conditions such as cancer and Parkinson’s disease (two diseases with medicines difficult to 
source).  Almost all pharmacists have experienced turning clients away more than once 
(93% of pharmacists surveyed). Pharmacists are concerned of the effect on patients (70%) 
and many spend significant periods of time sourcing medicines (80%).  Almost 70% of 
pharmacists have to wait 3 to 5 days for manufacturers to make emergency deliveries, 
while 80% report wholesalers being out of stock for 5 to 50 medicines (an increase from 
2009).  Branded medicines appear particularly difficult to find, and manufacturers with 
bespoke supply deals seem more susceptible to stock shortages.  Almost all pharmacists 
(93%) have had to ask a GP to change a prescription due to supply issues, while 86% have 
rated industry and government efforts to solve supply shortages as poor.  As a result, 
almost two-thirds believe that shortages will be worse during the next year and only one-
third of those surveyed believe the situation will stay the same. 
 
Implications for manufacturers  
In principle, manufacturers have an obvious financial and non-financial incentive to 
promote the agency model or distribute their products via the reduced wholesaler model; 
this incentive lies in at least three fronts: first, by selecting either of the above 
arrangements they can largely control where the stock actually goes, and this has direct 
implications for parallel trade (especially parallel exports), in the sense that conducting 
parallel trade activities may prove more difficult with the new distribution arrangements; 
second, subject to negotiation with the preferred agent or wholesaler(s) of choice, there is 
always an opportunity to retain part of the wholesaler’s margin, although this will need to 
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be balanced against the requirement to invest into a distribution model in the short-term. 
And, third, manufacturers see the new distribution model as a possibility to improve 
medicine supply to patients and, indirectly, get closer to patients, via pharmacies. This last 
point is more strategic in nature and seems to underpin a significant part of the rationale 
towards agency or reduced wholesaler distribution. By directly serving specific 
communities, pharmacies have access to and directly store information about the needs of 
these communities.  
One leading manufacturer stressed at interview that getting closest to patients was the 
primary consideration for changing the distribution model arrangements and that they 
“work closely with pharmacists to ensure that the latter can obtain the company’s 
medicines and there is continuity of supply for UK patients”.  Further details on how 
precisely continuity of supply is guaranteed are lacking, although pharmacists experiencing 
difficulties are instructed to contact individual manufacturers’ customer contact centres.  
From a manufacturer’s perspective, shortages are not justified. 
 
Implications for pharmacy  
Pharmacists are primarily concerned about three issues: the first relates to having to 
manage with a more complex distribution model and the second deals with medicine 
shortages; to an extent, these two issues seem to be interlinked. Finally, the third issue is 
falling profitability across a number of products. 
The first issue arises from an increasingly fragmented structure in distribution. 
Pharmacists are having to source product from a variety of sources, instead of simply 
placing an order with a full-line wholesaler. If the product in question is subject to an 
agency agreement, they will need to order directly from manufacturers, whereas if it is 
subject to a reduced wholesaler agreement, it could lead to extra time to secure a delivery if 
one or more of the preferred wholesalers do not have the product in stock and to further 
delays if none of them do. In the UK, pharmacists (individually) and the PSNC have 
complained that they had to wait three days or more for emergency stock to be delivered 
from a manufacturer (Chemist & Druggist 2010 survey). About 80 per cent of pharmacists 
said it was harder to source products from pharmaceutical firms running distribution 
schemes, the Chemist & Druggist Stock Survey 2010 found and only 6 per cent said supply 
deals had improved access to medicines. It is recognised that pharmacists are spending 
precious time each day trying to source medicines – an activity which, in principle, takes 
them away from direct patient contact.  The Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain 
(RPSGB) has highlighted that while the effect on patients is being mitigated by the 
tremendous efforts of pharmacists, the additional workload to source medicines is putting 
huge pressure on frontline staff. Whether this is sustainable over the longer term is 
unknown, but interviewees who contributed to this section highlighted this as an issue of 
significant concern for the profession. 
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The reasons for stock shortages are diverse, ranging from (a) raw material shortages to (b) 
parallel trade and (c) manufacturer distribution systems.  It is likely that the combination 
of parallel export potential due to lower prices coupled with changes in the distribution 
system have contributed to a surge in shortages reported in countries such as the UK 
during 2009-2010. Indeed, in the UK, the PSNC reports that 13 of the 19 manufacturers 
whose products either appear on shortages lists or are most frequently linked to shortages 
operate a supply model. Parallel trade (parallel exports in particular) seems to be one 
contributing factor to this problem, although, according to estimates, less than one in ten 
pharmacies parallel trade. Rigorously enforced quotas seem to be in operation and 
pharmacists have complained that with the new distribution arrangements, getting hold of 
just a couple of extra packs of medicine can turn into a lengthy and humiliating 
interrogation highlighting issues of trust between manufacturers and pharmacists.  
Agency models, where they apply, essentially mean that wholesalers to not own the stock 
and simply deliver to pharmacy without the ability of passing a discount on to pharmacy. If 
pharmacies rely on discount income for their overall income – as is the case in countries 
such as the UK and the Netherlands - and if manufacturers do not offer a discount, then the 
agency model may well result in brand profitability for pharmacies. In the UK, the recent 
advent of Direct-To-Pharmacy (DTP) distribution by a number of manufacturers since 
2007 has meant that many pharmacies now dispense branded medication at a loss, due to 
the lack of wholesaler discount on these lines. Interviews with independent community 
pharmacists have highlighted this problem. 
‘Pharmacists switched off about 15 years ago when the PSNC was allowed to take 
control of negotiating, and took a back seat. My clawback4 is about 9.8-10.5% but 
this depends on the nature of dispensing the pharmacy does. When I dispense a GSK 
product that is not a zero discount (ZD)5 line, I accrue an immediate 2-4% loss. The 
retained margin via the clawback is definitely not a true reflection of what the new 
pharmacy contract asks for, and the new contract is definitely more expensive to 
service’.6 
‘The new pharmacy contract is definitely more expensive to service than the old 
one. The costs of DTP were never included into the new contract, and so a loss 
arises. Pharmacies who entered under relaxed entry laws took money out of the 
global sum, so there was less of the retained margin to compete for. There are still 
drugs that I dispense at DTP which are not on the ZD list, such as Viagra; but there 
are many others, so yes, I dispense branded medicine at a loss. Operating costs have 
increased in recent years, with energy and fuel costs rising, and wholesalers 
imposing a fuel surcharge.’7 
                                                           
4
 A policy, whereby the government retains part of the discount achieved by pharmacies.  
5
 Refers to a number of products which carry nil discount from wholesalers. 
6
 Interview with an independent community pharmacist. 
7
 Interview with an independent community pharmacist. 
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Meetings and interviews with stakeholders in the UK and, to a lesser degree, the 
Netherlands have highlighted that the combined effect of changes in the distribution chain 
leads to pharmacies having to spend more time sourcing products and that this can be at 
the expense of frontline services towards patients, whilst at the same time making a range 
of products, particularly those subjected to DTP arrangements, significantly less profitable. 
This affects equally community pharmacies as well as chain pharmacies, as the latter are 
not immune to changes in the distribution system and are often subjected to similar 
searches for products on behalf of patients. It is, however, likely that the impact in terms of 
search costs is lower in chain pharmacies than it is in community pharmacies. Overall, 
pharmacies and their representative bodies are totally opposed to this type of development 
as it increases their operating cost and can have adverse impact on the quality of 
contracted services. 
 
Implications for wholesaling  
In Directive 2001/83/EC, the public service obligation was defined as “..the obligation 
placed on wholesalers to guarantee permanently an adequate range of medicinal products 
to meet the requirements of a specific geographical area and to deliver the supplies 
requested within a very short time over the whole of the area in question.” Extensive use of 
a reduced wholesaler model in principle satisfies the public service obligation, but, as 
discussed previously, it does mean that the concept of full-line wholesalers effectively 
becomes redundant. The interpretation of the public service obligation varies in different 
Member States and this sometimes means that a public service obligation does not exist.  
Agency or Direct-To-Pharmacy (DTP) distribution arrangements imply the involvement of 
one wholesaler only to distribute branded products to pharmacy. The wholesalers never 
own the medicine, and only act as couriers or logistics providers, who are in no position to 
offer any discount on the products they distribute. The argument is that, where an agency 
model exists, it effectively gives manufacturers outright control on pricing and discounting 
of their medicines. 
Wholesalers argue that recent developments in wholesale distribution are an inefficient 
way of distributing medicines to pharmacies and then on to patients. According to one 
source, the agency or the reduced wholesaler model “have added significantly higher 
numbers of vehicles on the road from multiple agents doing precisely the same as prior to 
the advent of this new reality; this cannot but be an inefficient outcome, as, among other 
things, it increases the environmental footprint of distribution altogether.” 
Meetings with wholesalers (Phoenix, AH), who continue to be bound by the public service 
obligation, suggest they have been worried about the supply chain for a while, as well as 
concerned about the effects the changes in distribution – particularly shortages - are having 
on patients, in terms of public health impact and safety.  It is also suggested that regulators 
and competent authorities have little power to change the system unless health outcomes 
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are shown to be affected due to shortages.  In addition, it is believed that passing the 
sourcing burden onto pharmacists complicates a previously simple process, and they try to 
ensure that their distribution is ‘fair across distribution channels’. Wholesalers also 
contend that availability will continue to be a problem whilst insufficient supply struggles 
to meet demand.  
It is likely that, based on the above changes in the distribution system, a wave of 
consolidation among wholesalers may take place, and some may altogether be driven out of 
the market. 
 
Implications for patients 
Patients are very concerned about medicine shortages, particularly in rural areas and 
across illnesses that require timely access to needed medicines, as, in the opposite case, 
care and outcomes care and outcomes can be negatively affected. Negative effects on 
patient health are not unusual with stock shortages, in addition to the added anxiety it may 
bring on fragile health states.  Increased stress due to lack of medicine can have significant 
negative effects on top of the stress of chronic illnesses.  Not only is this the case for 
branded but also for generic versions as well at times, in addition to doctors’ having to 
change their care plans due to stock shortages.  
There is some evidence that the changing nature of supply in the distribution chain may be 
impacting access to and availability of medicines, although the evidence base is hitherto 
weak and relies on one survey. The results of Chemists and Druggists’ Stock Survey8 in the 
UK, explicitly referred to several pharmacist-reported cases of patients’ health suffering 
because they simply could not get hold of prescribed medications, ranging from geriatric 
patients forced to catch three separate buses to track down their medicine to fits in 
epilepsy sufferers leading to hospital admissions. 
 
Ensuring availability: the payer view  
Payers find little reason to intervene unless patient access to medicines is significantly 
affected or shortages are shown to be having an impact on care and outcomes. At the same 
time, it looks as though breaches from the public service obligation do not necessarily 
occur in situations where a reduced wholesaler model operates. 
Nevertheless, in the UK, recent concerns about product shortages have led to some action 
by the competent authorities. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) has agreed to carry out a targeted programme of inspections, and if manufacturers 
or wholesalers are found to be in breach of legal duties to maintain an adequate supply of 
medicines they risk prosecution and losing their licences. Similarly, pharmacists and 
                                                           
8
 http://www.chemistanddruggist.co.uk/stocksurvey2010. 
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doctors will be held to account by their professional bodies for failing in their ethical 
obligation to put patients first. The UK government has also promised to raise the 
standards required for wholesaler dealers’ licences, including inspection, sunset clauses 
and re-licensing, and other measures include the development and maintenance of a list of 
drugs that are endangered, “so that no-one has the excuse that they were not aware of 
supply difficulties”, as the Department of Health explained, as well as the prioritisation of 
products on that list for further investigation to find possible resolutions to the worst 
supply issues. In addition, best practice guidance for dispensing doctors, pharmacy, 
wholesalers and manufacturers is intended to take place in order to help them better 
manage supply problems. Finally, and managing within the current environment of 
distribution model changes, it is explored how manufacturers and wholesalers could be 
assigned a “more explicit duty” to ensure that stocks do not run dry, as well as the 
feasibility of establishing buffer stocks to be held by wholesalers, to help give the supply 
chain greater flexibility. 
 
7.3. Policies on distribution margins and their implications 
7.3.1. Key issues 
The information on wholesale and pharmacy margins, collected from various sources, 
including the PPRI reports and updated and confirmed by own inquiries, the PGEU and 
GIRP, found startling differences between countries in the methodologies they apply and 
the actual margins themselves.  The creation of regressive margins may have as little as 2 
categories (e.g. Spain) or more than 10 (e.g. Austria).  Depending on the Member State, the 
final margin category may be set at more than €600 or less than €20. Private negotiations 
can be found in wholesale margins and pharmacies typically receive discounts from 
wholesalers or benefit financially from other arrangements e.g. for timely settlement of 
invoices, bulk purchasing, etc. Many Member States have created fixed maximum margins 
above a certain threshold which may be less than €10 or more than 50€ of the ex-factory 
or the wholesale price.   
These patterns divulge the diversity of distribution remuneration throughout the EU, as 
well as their application in different drug classes or differently priced drugs (e.g. expensive 
versus low-priced medicines).  The application of these margins across the seven 
molecules, reflects this diversity in margins in the large price gaps found between Member 
States.  Although the price gap is largest for low-priced medicines, particularly generics, it 
is also found in mid-priced and expensive medicines. 
The price gap between Member States is more apparent for generic medicines than 
branded medicines.  In a number of cases, the EFP portion for the generic medicine was 
less than 10% of the gross PRP and in many cases less than 50%.  In those countries, the 
examination of the branded counterpart also found low relative EFP but not near to the 
same extent as the generic version. 
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Overall, it appears that for most countries and most medicine types (price and 
branded/generic), the EFP determines to some extent the final gross PRP.  There are, 
however, some exceptions to this rule where countries can swing wildly between 
beginning with a low EFP and ending up middle to high range, and vice versa. 
These patterns suggest major differences between Member States in their distribution 
costs as well as large differences in their applications to branded versus generic medicines. 
 
7.3.2. Stakeholder perspectives 
Manufacturers 
Manufacturers recognize the importance and contribution of the distribution sector to 
ensuring access and availability of medicines to patients. Yet, it is often argued that the cost 
of distribution is in many cases disproportionate to the value it offers to the general public 
and, as such, should be reconsidered and become more in-line with the contribution that 
the pharmaceutical sector makes in terms of bringing new therapeutic alternatives to 
market. Equally, it has been argued that where brands and generics co-exist, the structure 
of margins and markups in many cases favour generic medicines, thus creating an unequal 
playing field among equivalent therapeutic options. This is exacerbated in situations where 
therapeutic reference pricing exists and where branded, in-patent products are included in 
therapeutic clusters.  
Partly as a result of the above, it is not uncommon for manufacturers to consider more 
direct options to distribute their products and reach pharmacies. Although this implies 
considerable initial investment, it is often considered worthwhile. Other stakeholders in 
the distribution chain contend that these movements by manufacturers automatically 
result in wholesale (and, potentially, retail) margins and other income being curtailed as 
manufacturers can re-define the terms of engagement by wholesalers. 
Wholesalers 
Wholesalers operate on the basis of large volume and small margin. They feel squeezed by 
the nature of competition and the requirements of public service obligation and frequent 
distribution to retail outlets, the net result being a very low net margin on wholesale 
distribution of medicines. They also perceive recent changes in the distribution model in a 
number of Member States, particularly relating to higher cost medicines, as partial and 
creaming off a significant source of revenue for their operations. Where already 
experienced, the direct involvement of manufacturers in distribution has changed the way 
the sector operates and the ability of wholesalers to compete and offer value deals to their 
customers. 
It is likely that if these trends become more generalised in the years to come, the wholesale 
sector will experience further consolidation. Already, as pointed out at interview, a number 
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of wholesalers have gone out of business or have merged with others, as a direct impact of 
the above trends. 
Pharmacies 
Pharmacists often feel they are asked to do more for less, that there is reluctance by payers 
to remunerate them for additional services rendered and that, as a result, other segments 
within pharmacy is cross-subsidising the POM segment. Importantly, the changing role of 
pharmacy in the community does not necessarily seem to be reflected by actions at policy 
level. In addition, their ability to negotiate terms with wholesalers is beginning to change in 
environments where products are delivered directly by manufacturers and where 
pharmacy is incurring a significantly higher cost in search of product. 
 
Patients 
Patients are largely unaware of the costs of distribution and their primary consideration is 
the availability and affordability of medicines. Distribution remuneration, particularly at 
retail level, should capture some of the gaps in availability, particularly in remote or rural 
areas where such problems seem to be more acute. Patients in some cases argue that the 
pursuit of profit across pharmacy chains is responsible for problems in the geographical 
allocation of pharmacies and that this ought to be addressed. 
Insurers and payers 
Insurers face a significant cost of distribution and taxation. Significant changes have taken 
place over the past decade in the majority of Member States in an attempt to reduce the 
impact of distribution (but not taxation) and calibrate remuneration structures, often 
resulting in a reduction of wholesaler and – in some cases – retail margins. 
In some cases, health insurers have experimented with “novel” initiatives for the retail 
market, such as tendering and rebate policies. Apart from the unintended consequences 
that such schemes may have9, these initiatives have revealed, among other things, the 
reservation price of mature (off-patent) medicines and the cost payers should be paying 
without it being inflated by discounts. 
In some Member States the cost of taxation is set at disproportionate levels. While a 
majority of Member States have set reduced (or zero) VAT rates for prescription medicines, 
in some (e.g. Austria, Denmark and Germany) normal rate VAT levels reflect the perception 
of prescription medicines as normal consumption goods. While there is little in terms of a 
theoretical or empirical justification for imposing VAT on prescription medicines, its use 
reflects a reverse tax by national Treasuries on health care resources. Yet, it appears that 
                                                           
9 These have also explored in a previous EMINet report (2009) on preference-based policies and rebate 
policies and relate to the impact on pharmacy operations, among others. 
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there is little Ministries of Health or sickness funds can do to mitigate this, as it relates to 
national (taxation) policy priorities, where decisions are taken by Finance Ministries. 
 
7.4. Impact of Distribution Margins and Markups on Retail Prices 
7.4.1. Key trends 
From the pricing analysis of the seven molecules, a number of patterns emerge, which also 
carry important messages for decision-makers and other stakeholders.   
First, to there seems to be significant price variation across products and across 
countries. It appears there continue to be significant variations in prices between Member 
States (a) during all stages of the price building exercise, from the initial EFP to the final 
gross PRP, and (b) among originator brands and generics. Of course, this is the effect of 
regulation and the way it applies across brands and generics. Price variations amongst 
brands were greatest among older medicines and narrower among newer medicines. 
Comparing a sample of seven medicines and the portions making up the final gross PRP, 
the smallest price gap (between lowest and highest) in branded prices amongst Member 
States was 79% for branded HP-A PPP and the largest range was 2206% for branded LP-
GERD EFP.  Among generic medicines, the smallest price gap found was 243% for generic 
MP-CVD net PRP pharmacy margin/markup and largest price gap found was 9177% for 
generic LP-HC PPP.  The majority of the large differences between Member States were 
reported for wholesale and pharmacy margin/markups, both in branded and generic 
versions. 
Second, margins/markups have on certain occasions significant impact on retail 
prices. Certain countries appear to have consistently high or consistently low prices, with 
not much movement with the application of margins/markups.  Germany, for example, has 
consistently high EFP and PRP in general. Other countries have low EFPs, but distribution 
margins have a significant impact and elevate their retail prices towards the higher end of 
the EU-27 distribution (e.g. Italy, Greece). These effects can be seen in Figures 7.1 – 7.5. 
Finally, some countries seem to have very high generic prices (e.g. Greece, Figure 7.5) 
irrespective of the impact distribution margins have on EFP. 
Third, the difference between branded and generic versions of gross PRP of the same 
medicine varies between and within Member States.  Ex-factory price as a proportion of 
gross PRP between Member States is far greater for generic versus branded medicines, 
particularly for low priced medicines.  This extends to within Member States, where certain 
members such as Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and UK, show different distribution between 
branded and generic versions within the country.   
Fourth, differences in wholesale and pharmacy retail margin/markups affect 
expensive, mid- and low-priced medicines differently.  Specifically, the absolute EFP price 
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gap between Member States is smaller for expensive and mid-priced medicines (price gap 
range 104-353%) than low-price medicines (364-8610%) both generic and branded, and 
continued with gross PRP.   Examinations of the proportions of the gross PRP found larger 
differences between Member States for generic medicines only.  Generic EFP as percent 
gross PRP found low-priced medicines had a larger price gap (range 86-89% than mid-
priced generics (range 44-97%), while proportional pharmacy margin/markups also 
displayed larger price gap for low-priced generics (price gap range 88-95%) than mid-
priced generic medicines (24.8-37.8%). 
Fifth, there appears to be a greater effect of margin/markups on lower-priced drugs, 
particularly generics, than expensive drugs. Examination of the following rankings 
(Figures A2.1 – A2.11) using the Netherlands as an example, finds that the most dramatic 
movements in placement take place for generic LP-HC than any other medicine.  In the case 
of the Netherlands this is due to the relatively high (in comparison with other countries) 
flat dispensing fee on a low-priced generic product. Similar trends hold for Greece and 
Ireland. 
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Figure 7.1 
HP-A ex-factory price (EFP) (upper panel) and net pharmacy retail price (PRP) (lower 
panel) (including dispensing fees but no VAT) ranking across the EU27 Member States, as 
of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta, Lithuania and Poland, not available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from Member States. 
 
 88 
Figure 7.2 
Branded MP-S ex-factory price (EFP) (upper panel) and net pharmacy retail price (PRP) 
(lower panel) (including dispensing fees but no VAT) ranking across the EU27 Member 
States, as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta and Estonia not available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from Member States. 
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Figure 7.3 
Generic MP-S ex-factory price (EFP) (upper panel) and net pharmacy retail price (PRP) 
(lower panel) (including dispensing fees but no VAT) ranking across the EU27 Member 
States, as of 15 June 2009 
 
 
Note: Data for several Member States not available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from Member States. 
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Figure 7.4 
Branded LP-HC ex-factory price (EFP) (upper panel) and net pharmacy retail price (PRP) 
(lower panel) (including dispensing fees but no VAT) ranking across the EU27 Member 
States, as of 15 June 2009 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta, Lithuania and Latvia not available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from Member States. 
 91 
Figure 7.5 
Generic LP-HC ex-factory price (EFP) (upper panel) and net pharmacy retail price (PRP) 
(lower panel) (including dispensing fees but no VAT) ranking across the EU27 Member 
States, as of 15 June 2009 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta not available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from Member States. 
 
 
7.5. Distribution margins: brands versus generics 
Comparisons of branded medicines with their generic versions were made to determine 
the impact of wholesale and pharmacy margins on final prices in EU27 and to identify 
similarities or differences across Member States.  First, the extent of price gaps between 
highest and lowest countries for EFP, PPP and PRP were identified for generic and branded 
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medicines.  Second, the relative impact of wholesale and pharmacy margins on PRP was 
compared for branded and generic medicines, across Member States. 
Two widely used products, where this occurs are LP-GERD and LP-HC and the distribution 
costs as a proportion of retail price are outlined in Figure 7.6. Distribution costs for 
generics are highest in Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands and Sweden.  
 
 
Figure 7.6: LP-HC and LP-GERD as percent of gross PRP, branded (1st column per country) and 
generic (2nd column per country) versions presented side-by-side, as of 15 June 2009 
 LP-HC (20 mg, 28 day pack): Comparison of Percent Distribution of Branded (1st column per country) to Generic 
(2nd column) Prices 
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LP-GERD (20 mg, 28 day pack): Comparison of Percent Distribution of Branded (1st column per country) 
to Generic (2nd column) Prices
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Note: Data for some Member States not available. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from pricing data received from the Member States. 
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8. Overall Conclusions 
8.1. Summary of Key Findings 
• There are variations between Member States in the degree and content of 
regulations of distribution margins as well as the overall operating framework 
concerning wholesaling and retailing. 
• There are large variations between Member States in the degree of vertical and 
horizontal integration. 
• “New” distribution models seem to be emerging in many Member States, although 
their uptake is subject to market conditions or may be constrained by the regulatory 
arrangements regarding wholesaling and retail operations; Direct to Pharmacy 
(DTP) is one of these and DTP arrangements can be found in many Member States;  
although its application is restricted to the UK currently; Reduced Wholesaler 
Arrangements (RWA) or sole wholesaler arrangements, however, are beginning to 
have considerable impact on overall distribution. In some cases, wholesalers are 
used as agents to distribute products as logistics providers. 
• Numerous developments in the type, breadth and depth of additional services 
offered by both wholesalers and pharmacies, also highlighting pressures in the 
existing distribution model. 
• Variations exist between Member States in the type and application of wholesale 
and pharmacy margins 
• Distribution obviously has an impact on the prices that payers pay, but this varies by 
Member State (as a result of different policies being implemented) and by the 
general (EFP) price level  
• Taxation of prescription medicines, by means of variable VAT rates, continues to be 
an issue in most Member States and in a few the normal VAT rate applies. 
 
8.2. Findings by category 
8.2.1. Market structure of pharmaceutical wholesaling and retailing in the EU  
There is a diversity and fragmentation of wholesaling and retailing entities at EU level, as 
reflected by the market structure of both wholesaling, but, more importantly, retailing 
entities. Significant variation continues to exist in the density of wholesale and retail 
outlets in the EU, propagated by national regulation and historical patterns. 
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There exist different densities in terms of number of wholesalers and number of 
pharmacies in the population in the member states, as well as different regulatory policies 
setting the operating framework for distribution (both wholesale and retail) outlets. 
Some consolidation in activities has been observed over time, particularly in pharmacies, as 
experienced by horizontal integration through pharmacy chains. 
Vertical integration has been on the ascendancy particularly with wholesaler groups taking 
over pharmacies or pharmacy chains, although the opposite is also possible.  
The frequency and influence of schemes such as DTP and RWM has risen substantially in 
the past 5 years; this trend can alter the rules of the game, particularly where the public 
service obligation is not present. Through a variety of schemes manufacturers are in a 
position to bypass wholesalers and sell directly to pharmacies.  
Elements of diversification (expansion of services) by both wholesalers and pharmacies, 
particularly where there is a squeeze on margins have been shown to exist as a response to 
some of the pressures on margins and the emergence of new distribution models. 
 
8.2.2. Distribution Margins 
The majority of Member States have regulated markup/margin schemes to both wholesale 
and retail segments, at least for reimbursable medicines.  
There are different markup/margin schemes for reimbursable and non-reimbursable 
medicines in a few countries, specific schemes for other retailers of prescription medicines 
in the very few countries where such other retailers operate and a specific incentive for 
dispensing generics in one country (France). 
Regressive markup/margins are very common, but some countries also apply linear 
markups/margins. For pharmacies, dispensing fees are used in a few countries, and in one 
country (Slovenia) pharmacies are funded on a fee-for-service remuneration. Average 
wholesale margins range from 2-24% of PRP (low in Sweden, high in the Netherlands, both 
unregulated private negotiations), with the majority ranging between 4-8% of PRP.   
Considerably less information is available regarding the average pharmacy margin in a 
country; however, for the 15 countries for which average pharmacy margins could be 
surveyed, the range is 12-50% of PRP (low in Romania, high in Luxembourg).  
Discounts and rebates play an important role defining the precise amount of the wholesale 
and pharmacy remuneration. On the one hand, in several countries commercial discounts 
(offered by manufacturers to wholesalers, by wholesalers to pharmacies, by manufacturers 
to pharmacies, and in some cases by pharmacies to patients) are granted, in a few cases 
limited by regulation. The exact level of these discounts and rebates is confidential. On the 
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other hand, wholesalers and, in particular, pharmacies are obliged to grant discounts and 
rebates to the public payers in nine countries (known as “clawback” or “solidarity 
contribution”).  
8.2.3. Impact of Wholesale and Retail Margins on the Prices of Prescription 
Medicines  
It looks as though that there is a tremendous range in prices at each stage of the exercise 
from EFP to gross PRP between EU27 Member States.  This price spread between lowest 
and highest is significantly more apparent in generic medicines than it is in branded, and 
far more apparent in less expensive medicines than more expensive medicines. 
Although EFP appears to some extent to predict approximately the final gross PRP to the 
payer, this is not always the case.  Countries such as Greece, Italy and Luxembourg for 
branded medicines, and the Netherlands for generic medicines saw dramatic changes in 
their ranking with the addition of wholesale and pharmacy margins. This highlights the fact 
that the impact of distribution is different in different Member States. 
It appears that the application of distribution margins may be different between branded 
and generic medicines, in some countries in particular.  Countries with consistently low 
EFP, in some cases less than 5 percent of the final gross PRP, were Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden – of interest these countries also had low relative EFP for 
their branded counterparts.   
The structure of wholesale and retail margins does mean that in certain, but extreme, cases 
the impact of distribution costs and taxation exceeds 90% of the total cost to health 
systems and the average seems to be higher than in the case of branded medicines. 
 
8.2.4. The changing market structure – impact on stakeholders 
Manufacturers 
Manufacturers would in principle be interested in a supply chain that guarantees the 
efficient distribution of their products for the intended markets and at reasonable cost. 
Access to patient information at the micro level (i.e. in individual communities) would be 
key and an area worth investing in. In an era of logistics and stock management being 
driven remotely by advances in information and communication technology (ICT), the 
value-added of certain components of the distribution chain have often been questioned in 
relation to the services provided and the overall cost of these services.10 As a result, it is not 
surprising that manufacturers explore alternative (wholesale) distribution arrangements. 
                                                           
10 Interviews with 4 leading manufacturers. 
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Wholesalers 
Wholesalers feel squeezed by current practices as well as some recent developments. 
Current practices in wholesaling suggest that wholesalers typically offer a proportion (in 
some cases significant) of their allowable margin as a discount to pharmacy. Interviews 
with wholesaler stakeholders alluded to actual margins ranging between 1.5 – 3.5%. 
Pharmacy chains may have greater negotiating power and can, as a result, benefit from a 
higher discount from wholesaling, although the extent to which this is true at aggregate 
level is unclear and can be the subject of further scrutiny. 
Competition among wholesalers for the retail business has intensified in recent years by 
developments in IT and logistics, as well as the entry of manufacturers who are 
increasingly interested in establishing direct vertical links with the retail business. In some 
cases, this is resulting in the map of players on the market being re-drawn with 
consolidation of existing entities and entry of others or a re-definition of activities by 
existing players.  
These dynamic developments can have a significant impact on wholesaling and the 
competitive advantages it has in the distribution of medicines. Interviews with wholesalers 
and other stakeholders indicate that the traditional full-line wholesaling model (stocking 
the widest possible gamut of pharmaceutical products, easy access to stock by and timely & 
frequent delivery to retailers) is under dispute – indirectly - in a number of Member States, 
particularly those where the environment is more flexible regarding ownership and 
integration. As a result, if wholesaling is to survive it will probably need to develop further 
competences and links downstream strengthening existing advantages. 
Pharmacy 
Retail market structure remains diverse across EU Member States, as does the regulatory 
environment relating to ownership, procurement and ability to integrate both horizontally 
and vertically. 
Greater efficiencies can be achieved by joint procurement and this can materialize through 
a horizontally or a vertically integrated structure or a cooperative. Countries where 
horizontal or vertical integration are limited by current legislation are taking advantage of 
the “cooperative solution”, e.g. Spain, France and Greece.  
Redefining the role of pharmacy is a great pursuit, particularly in what concerns health 
promotion, prevention, aspects of disease management and monitoring. There may be 
considerable benefits to society and the health care system from this development in terms 
of quality, access and cost. Pharmacy chains are likely to benefit more from this 
development in terms of volume, facilities within pharmacy and network or population 
coverage. Yet, the willingness of health authorities to pursue this remains sluggish.  
An important competitive advantage of pharmacy, making it an attractive target to pursue 
further consolidation in the field is its direct relationship with the patient population and 
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the use by the latter as a source of information and advice. This is already driving 
developments in some Member States and further developments are still to come. 
Where access to pharmacy problems exist, particularly in rural or/and remote areas, 
alternative solutions may exist, e.g. via dispensaries or dispensing physicians. 
 
Patients  
Patients are in principle neutral to consolidation in the distribution sector, so long as 
access and availability of medicines are not compromised and the range of available 
services increases at no additional cost to them. Increasing services at pharmacy level 
could prove beneficial particularly if they are offered in a timely fashion and avoiding 
waiting times. In some instances, patients have raised questions about access to services 
and the length of time it takes for them to access a pharmacy. This is particularly important 
for elderly and vulnerable patients in rural areas. Where these phenomena exist action 
could be taken by the competent authorities to ensure that access remains at acceptable 
levels. Where pharmacies occupy a significant proportion of retail distribution access 
problems in rural areas could be addressed by operating outlets or other dispensaries in 
such  areas.  
Insurance and Payers 
From a payer perspective, greater consolidation could mean lower distribution costs 
because of economies of scale in procurement and distribution, taking advantage of 
common networks and more efficient operations. In theory, consolidation would imply 
lower fixed costs, but it is questionable whether compressing these can be achieved ad 
infinitum. It may even be doubtful whether cost reductions can be achieved in the first 
place given the changing patterns in the distribution of medicines and the increasing 
proliferation of agency and reduced wholesaler models.  
But even if these models are not taken into account for a moment, it is likely that the 
environment in the distribution chain is becoming more competitive with payers 
demanding greater generic dispensing (and, therefore, at a lower overall margin) and 
driving the market for generic products, as it has recently been seen with outpatient 
tendering in some countries (the Netherlands, Germany, and Hungary, among others).  
Such developments are unlikely to enable further sustainable reductions in margins 
without having an impact on market structure of distribution.  
Additional services that can be provided by retail pharmacies could go some way to 
maintain existing structures, yet, it is not always clear what additional value these services 
create and what an adequate remuneration is as a result. For instance, health promotion 
campaigns, monitoring, audit, or clinical governance could be undertaken by pharmacies, 
yet, a number of stakeholders at national and regional level have suggested that they 
cannot support financially these services. 
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In an environment characterized by consolidation, payers need to be mindful that access to 
pharmacies is maintained overall, particularly in rural areas, which are, in principle, under-
provided. In areas where there seems to be a problem, rural pharmacies can be offered 
financial incentives to continue operating for the benefit of the wider community they 
serve.  
 
8.2.5. Changes to the prevailing distribution model 
Access and availability 
The changing nature of distribution and the advent of the agency and the reduced 
wholesaler models, is beginning to have a significant impact in some countries. In principle, 
changes in the distribution model should make the process of delivering medicines from 
factory gates to the patient bed-side more efficient and cost-effective. Yet, there seem to be 
some concerns about the availability of medicines; it could be the case that manufacturers’ 
activities in streamlining supplies and managing stock coupled with the ever fragmented 
nature of distribution, can lead to shortages in some markets. 
Clearly, there are all kinds of incentives and disincentives from different stakeholders’ 
perspective (manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers) in this process, but these do not seem 
to be aligned at all times. Payers, on the other hand, find little reason to intervene unless 
patient access to medicines is significantly affected or shortages are shown to be having an 
impact on care and outcomes. At the same time, it looks as though breaches from the public 
service obligation do not necessarily occur in situations where a reduced wholesaler model 
operates. This may be the subject of a wider further discussion on the subject. Competent 
authorities, where appropriate have intervened to provide some clarity on some of the 
newly emerging rules of the game. 
 
8.2.6. Policies on distribution margins and their implications 
The stakeholder perspectives in this part of the analysis revealed significant rifts in the 
perceptions of stakeholders about their respective contributions. 
Manufacturers 
Manufacturers recognize the importance and contribution of the distribution sector to 
ensuring access and availability of medicines to patients. Yet, it is often argued that the cost 
of distribution is in many cases disproportionate to the value it offers to the general public 
and, as such, should be reconsidered and become more in-line with the contribution that 
the pharmaceutical sector makes in terms of bringing new therapeutic alternatives to 
market. Equally, it has been argued that where brands and generics co-exist, the structure 
of margins and markups in many cases favour lower priced medicines, in fact generics in 
most cases, thus creating an unequal playing field among equivalent therapeutic options. 
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This is exacerbated in situations where therapeutic reference pricing exists and where 
branded, in-patent products are included in therapeutic clusters.  
Partly as a result of the above, it is not uncommon for manufacturers to consider more 
direct options to distribute their products and reach pharmacies. Although this implies 
considerable initial investment, it is often considered worthwhile. Other stakeholders in 
the distribution chain contend that these movements by manufacturers automatically 
result in wholesale (and, potentially, retail) margins and other income being curtailed as 
manufacturers can re-define the terms of wholesaler engagement. 
Wholesalers 
Wholesalers operate on the basis of large volume and small margin. They feel squeezed by 
the nature of competition and the requirements of public service obligation and frequent 
distribution to retail outlets, the net result being a very low net margin on wholesale 
distribution of medicines. They also perceive recent changes in the distribution model in a 
number of Member States, particularly relating to higher cost medicines, as partial and 
creaming off a significant source of revenue for their operations. Where already 
experienced, the direct involvement of manufacturers in distribution has changed the way 
the sector operates and the ability of wholesalers to compete and offer value deals to their 
customers. 
It is likely that if these trends become more generalised in the years to come, the wholesale 
sector will experience further consolidation. Already, as pointed out at interview, a number 
of wholesalers have gone out of business or have merged with others, as a direct impact of 
the above trends. 
Pharmacies 
Pharmacists often feel they are asked to do more for less, that there is reluctance by payers 
to remunerate them for additional services rendered and that, as a result, other segments 
within pharmacy is cross-subsidising the reimbursement segment. Importantly, the 
changing role of pharmacy in the community does not necessarily seem to be reflected by 
actions at policy level. In addition, their ability to negotiate terms with wholesalers is 
beginning to change in environments where products are delivered directly by 
manufacturers and where pharmacy is incurring a significantly higher cost in search of 
product. 
Patients  
Patients are largely unaware of the costs of distribution and their primary consideration is 
the availability and affordability of medicines. Distribution remuneration, particularly at 
retail level, should capture some of the gaps in availability, particularly in remote or rural 
areas where such problems seem to be more acute. Patients in some cases argue that the 
pursuit of profit across pharmacy chains is responsible for problems in the geographical 
allocation of pharmacies and that this ought to be addressed. 
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Insurers and payers 
Insurers face a significant cost of distribution and taxation. Significant changes have taken 
place over the past decade in the majority of Member States in an attempt to reduce the 
impact of distribution (but not taxation) and calibrate remuneration structures, often 
resulting in a reduction of wholesale and retail margins. 
In some cases, health insurers have experimented with “novel” initiatives for the retail 
market, such as tendering and rebate policies. Apart from the unintended consequences 
that such schemes may have, these initiatives have revealed, among other things, the 
reservation price of mature (off-patent) medicines and the cost payers should be paying 
without it being inflated by discounts. 
In some Member States the cost of taxation is set at disproportionate levels. While a 
majority of Member States have set reduced (or zero) VAT rates for prescription medicines, 
in some (e.g. Denmark and Germany) normal rate VAT levels reflect the perception of 
prescription medicines as normal consumption goods. While there is little in terms of a 
theoretical or empirical justification for imposing VAT on prescription medicines, its use 
reflects a reverse tax by national Treasuries on health care resources. Yet, it appears that 
there is little Ministries of Health or sickness funds can do to mitigate this, as it relates to 
national (taxation) policy priorities, where decisions are taken by Finance Ministries. 
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Appendix 1: Data Requests and Open-Ended Interviews with GIRP and 
PGEU 
GIRP 
1. How many wholesalers are full line / short line? 
2. How many wholesalers are national / regional? 
3. What is the frequency of delivery from wholesalers to pharmacies?  Regulated 
frequency? 
4. How many wholesalers are involved in parallel imports?  What are the regulations 
surrounding parallel imports? 
5. Do any wholesalers also supply to other EU countries?  Which countries? 
6. Is integration between wholesaler and manufacturer allowed?  If yes, how many are 
involved?  What percent of market share do they have?  What regulations surround 
integration between wholesaler and manufacturer? 
7. Can manufacturers deliver directly to pharmacies?  If yes, how many do?  What percent 
of market share do they have?  What regulations surround manufacturer direct 
delivery? 
8. Can wholesalers integrate with pharmacies?  If yes, how many do?  What percent of 
market share do they have?  Do any produce their own brands of medicines?  What 
regulations surround integration between wholesaler and pharmacy?  Are any 
integrated wholesalers-pharmacies part of a chain? 
9. What is the average wholesale margins for reimbursed medicines? 
10. Are there any mandatory rebates/clawbacks/discounts for wholesale margins?  If yes, 
describe? 
11. What is the future of wholesaling in the EU? 
12. What are the issues surrounding wholesaling in EU countries? What is the impact of 
recent changes in wholesale distribution? 
 
PGEU 
1. How many pharmacies dispensing medicines to outpatients?  What locations do they 
operate from? 
2. What fees are involved in repeat prescriptions? 
3. Are pharmacists involved in provision of health services, such as blood pressure 
monitoring, further diagnostics or counseling?  If yes, what regulations surround this 
practice?  Any additional fees? 
4. Are pharmacy chains allowed?  If yes, what percent market share do they have?  What 
regulations surround chains?  Do any chains operate in other countries? 
5. Can manufacturers deliver directly to pharmacies?  If yes, how many do?  What percent 
of market share do they have?  What regulations surround manufacturer direct 
delivery? 
6. Can wholesalers integrate with pharmacies?  If yes, how many do?  What percent of 
market share do they have?  Do any produce their own brands of medicines?  What 
regulations surround integration between wholesaler and pharmacy?  Are any 
integrated wholesalers-pharmacies part of a chain? 
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7. What is the status of online pharmacies in the EU?  If these exist, where and how many?  
What percent market share do they have?  What regulations surround their existence?  
Are they part of a ‘bricks and mortar’ pharmacy? 
8. What is the average pharmacy margin for reimbursed medicines? 
9. Are there any mandatory rebates/claw backs/discounts for pharmacy margins?  If yes, 
describe? 
10. What are the key issues facing pharmacy in the EU? 
11. What is the future of pharmacy in the EU and what is the impact of current changes in 
the distribution model in many EU countries? 
 
 
 104 
Appendix 2: Wholesale and Retail Margins in EU-27 
This Appendix presents the current margin policies in EU-27, validated as of October 2010. 
Data is supplied separately in Excel.  
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Appendix 3: Pricing Information Incremental Graphing 
This Appendix contains as set of graphs  that build up incrementally on selected medicines 
from the ex-factory price (EFP) to pharmacy purchase price (PPP) to net pharmacy retail 
price (net PRP). At each step the countries are ranked from lowest to highest prices. 
The following caveats need to be considered when analyzing the pricing data provided by 
Member States: 
• Selected medicines were not available in all Member States. 
• The selected price types could not be delivered by all Member States. 
• Not all pack sizes were the same across countries, so the most common pack size 
was chosen and in some cases data were adjusted upwards or downwards as 
needed using unit (pill or capsule) price. 
• Prices were analyzed on unit basis. 
• PRP net are partly those paid by private customers (excluding VAT and other taxes), 
whereas in other countries those paid by the public payer were given by the 
Member States. 
• In some countries (e.g. the Netherlands) service charges are not included in the 
displayed prices. 
• Claw backs, public rebates or commercial discounts on either distribution levels as 
well as any non-product based discounts (e.g. price-volume agreements are not 
considered / deducted). 
• Reimbursement status and rates vary among the selected medicines and the 
Member States.  
• So called generic prices given concern the lowest priced product comparable to the 
originator available at the time of the survey. In some cases (e.g. Figure A3.2) the 
lowest priced product was a parallel import rather than a generic. 
• Biosimilars were also considered as “followers” and are labeled as generic. 
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Figure A3.1:  MP-S (branded): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta and Estonia not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.2: MP-S (generic): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for several Member States not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.3 HP-A: EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta, Lithuania and Poland not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.4: LP-HC (branded): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta, Latvia and Lithuania not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.5: LP-HC (generic): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
 
 111 
 
 
Figure A3.6: LP-GERD (branded): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States, as of 15 June 
2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.6: LP-GERD (generic): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.7: LP-HT (branded): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States, as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for several Member States not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.8: LP-HT (generic): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States, as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for several Member States not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.9: MP-CVD (branded): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States, as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.10: MP-CVD (generic): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States, as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for several Member States not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.11:  LP-D (branded): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States, as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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Figure A3.12: LP-D (generic): EFP, PPP, net PRP across EU27 Member States, as of 15 June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for Malta not available. 
Source: Pricing data received from the Member States. 
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